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A HUMAN CAPITAL THEORY OF ALIMONY AND TAX 
Tessa R. Davis*+ 
INTRODUCTION 
The taxation of alimony is broken. As a regime, it creates compliance 
burdens for taxpayers and administrative challenges for the Internal Revenue 
Service (the “Service” or “IRS”), and it may give rise to significant equity 
concerns. In short, the taxation of alimony is in need of reform. 
The rule is simply stated: alimony is income to the recipient and deduct-
ible by the payor. Yet the seeming simplicity of this rule—found in section 
71 of the Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”)—belies the fact that it has a 
complex history and is markedly difficult to enforce.1 A few elements of the 
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+ As this Article entered final production at the close of 2017, Congress enacted significant changes to the 
Internal Revenue Code in the form of an act colloquially known as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017. 
Among other things, the Act repealed the current tax treatment of alimony, adopting instead, for taxable 
years beginning after 2018, the proposed no-deduction/inclusion regime advocated in this Article. It is 
always pleasing to see one’s policy proposals enacted into law, even where Congress does so without 
explanation and right before publication. Notwithstanding that the reform advocated herein has been ac-
complished before the presses started to run, the arguments of the Article are now particularly timely. The 
legislative history provides little discussion as to Congress’s rationale for the change. Stating only that 
“the intent of the provision is to follow the rule of the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Gould v. 
Gould,” the Conference Report leaves tax practitioners and commentators to speculate on the motivating 
rationale for the change. The most obvious immediate purpose is that the new regime raised revenue: 
Because the act was passed via the reconciliation process, supporters of the bill were eager to find revenue 
gains where possible, and the Conference Report assumed repeal would raise $6.9 billion over a ten-year 
budget window. This Article fills the gap left by Congress as it provides holistic consideration of the 
various rationales for the changes to the taxation of alimony hastily adopted by Congress.  
 1 This Article uses the term alimony as tax law uses that term. However, many jurisdictions have 
replaced the term with “maintenance” or “support.” Alabama law, for example, uses the term alimony to 
represent two conceptually distinct concepts. Alimony may be either “alimony in gross” or “periodic ali-
mony,” where alimony in gross is “the present value of the wife’s inchoate marital rights—dower, home-
stead and distributive share, which are being terminated by the divorce.” Periodic alimony is meant “to 
provide for the current and continuous support of the wife.” Dees v. Dees, 390 So. 2d 1060, 1064 (Ala. 
Civ. App. 1980). Ohio, in contrast, describes payments that are substantively similar to Alabama’s peri-
odic alimony as “spousal support.” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.18 (West 2017). This difference in 
terminology may or may not represent a difference in the supposed rationale for why the payment is made. 
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provision itself give rise to interpretive and computational complexity.2 For 
example, it has proved persistently challenging to determine whether pay-
ments under a divorce decree end at the death of the recipient former spouse.3 
Some computational complexity arises in subsection (f) as well, which re-
captures property settlements in alimony’s clothing so such transfers receive 
their proper tax treatment.4 But the roots of the regime’s complexity stem 
from the fact that the theory and substance of the tax concept of alimony (“tax 
alimony”) are detached from the alimony of family law. A solution to the 
current challenges lies in rationalizing the understandings between alimony 
tax and family law.  
Tax law has drawn a costly line in the sand in its treatment of transfers 
at or incident to divorce, and that line undermines the efficacy of the tax ali-
mony regime. A transfer may be characterized as child support, property set-
tlement, or alimony with the former excluded from the recipient’s income 
and nondeductible to the payor and the latter included by the recipient and 
deductible to the payor.5 With three potential classifications and two differing 
  
When this Article uses the term alimony, it is used to encompass any payments made with intent to provide 
support to a spouse for his life that are not conceived as a property division. The tenuousness of the con-
ceptual distinction between these two categories, and its import for tax law, will be explored in the Article, 
however. 
 2 Section 71 defines alimony in a seemingly uncomplicated fashion. 26 U.S.C. § 71(b)–(e) (2012). 
To be alimony, a payment must satisfy each of seven elements: (1) The payment must be in cash to or on 
behalf of the payee spouse; (2) the payment must be made per a divorce decree or other qualifying instru-
ment; (3) the payor and payee must not designate the payment as not being alimony; (4) the payor and 
payee must not share a household; (5) the payments must not continue after the payee dies; (6) the payor 
and payee must file separate returns; and (7) the payments must not be child support. Id. See also discus-
sion infra Part I.A.3. 
 3 Doing so is essential to classifying a transfer as alimony under federal income tax law, however, 
because the termination-at-death requirement is one of the defining features of the contemporary tax def-
inition of alimony (“tax alimony”). For examples of courts struggling with this task, see Wolens v. United 
States 125 Fed. Cl. 422, 429–31 (2016) (addressing the applicable law for determining whether payments 
cease at death where the instrument is silent); Iglicki v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (RIA) 2015–80 (2015) (discuss-
ing whether payments made pursuant to a judgment entered after default satisfied the “terminate at death” 
requirement of section 71(b)). 
 4 Section 71(f) defines and recaptures “excess alimony.” 26 U.S.C. § 71(f) (2012). The concept of 
excess alimony and the different treatment it will receive once it is deemed to be a disguised property 
settlement will be discussed further infra Part I.B.2.a. In brief, property transfers during marriage and 
incident to divorce are governed by 26 U.S.C. § 1041, which is a nonrecognition provision. 
 5 26 U.S.C. §§ 71, 215, 262, 1041 (2012). For example, assume a woman transfers $1,000 per 
month to her former spouse. If that transfer meets the requirements of section 71 and is categorized as 
alimony, it will give rise to a $1,000 above-the-line deduction per section 215. The recipient’s former 
spouse then must include the $1,000 as income per sections 61 and 71. If the payment is instead classified 
as a property settlement, the $1,000 remains in the woman’s tax base (i.e., does not give rise to a deduc-
tion) and is excluded from the recipient’s income. If the $1,000 is classified as child support, it is pulled 
out of the alimony definition by 26 U.S.C. § 71(c)(1), meaning it remains taxable to the payor and ex-
cluded by the recipient. 26 U.S.C. § 215 (2012). By operation of 26 U.S.C. § 62(a)(10), the deduction for 
alimony is classified as “above the line,” meaning the deduction is taken as the taxpayer winnows her 
gross income down to her adjusted gross income. Taxpayers typically prefer above-the-line deductions to 
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tax treatments, individuals continue to (either inadvertently or intentionally) 
misclassify transfers as alimony that are, in fact, property transfers or child 
support payments. Yet current law is the product of a congressional attempt 
to remedy the very complexity that leads to such misclassification.6  
Individuals continue to find themselves in conflict with the Service over 
the classification of alimony. Perhaps such conflicts are the inevitable cost of 
properly classifying a given transfer. Such a position may be reasonable but 
is undercut by the fact that current law is only superficially concerned with 
properly identifying whether a payment is, in substance, alimony, a property 
settlement, or child support. Stated differently, a payment that is understood 
to be alimony under family law doctrine can be classified as a property set-
tlement for tax law purposes. Indeed, circuit court opinions on the tax treat-
ment of a transfer steer clear of attempting to determine whether the payment 
is, in fact, alimony under state law.7  
The current regime also gives rise to enforcement challenges. A recent 
empirical study suggests that misclassification of alimony is more common 
and costly than prior estimates supposed. The study, conducted by the Treas-
ury Inspector General for Tax Administration (“TIGTA”) discovered that, in 
the tax year studied, noncompliance with section 71 resulted in $2.3 billion 
in alimony deductions for which there was no corresponding income inclu-
sion by the recipient.8 Of the more than half-million returns claiming an ali-
mony deduction in the taxable year studied, 47 percent had a deduction/in-
clusion mismatch.9 The study also found systemic problems with the 
  
itemized deductions (also known as “below-the-line”) because above-the-line deductions are not subject 
to the same limitations as itemized deductions. See 26 U.S.C. § 67 (2012) (providing for a 2% haircut on 
miscellaneous itemized deductions and the list of regular itemized deductions that are not subject to the 
haircut) and 26 U.S.C. § 68 (2012) (a provision reinstituted by the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 
that reduces itemized deductions as a taxpayer’s adjusted gross income increases. Section 68 is known as 
the Pease limitation). Section 1041 was a congressional response to the Supreme Court case United States 
v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 70–71 (1962), which held that a transfer of stock between a husband and wife 
pursuant to a separation agreement was a taxable event. See also Polone v. Comm’r, 505 F.3d 966, 971 
(9th Cir. 2007) (“These divorce settlements determined that divorce transactions were taxable events in 
the first instance; the cases were later legislatively overruled by enactment of section 1041 of the Internal 
Revenue Code.” (citation omitted)). 
 6 See discussion infra Part I.A. 
 7 “[W]hen state family law is ambiguous as to the termination of payments upon the death of the 
payee, a federal court will not engage in complex, subjective inquiries under state law; rather, the court 
will read the divorce instrument and make its own determination based on the language of the document.” 
Hoover v. Comm’r, 102 F.3d 842, 846 (6th Cir. 1996); see also Johanson v. Comm’r, 541 F.3d 973, 974–
75 (9th Cir. 2008); Kean v. Comm’r, 407 F.3d 186, 191–93 (3d Cir. 2005) (declining to delve into the 
“intricacies” of state family law). 
 8 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., REFERENCE NO. 
2014-40-022, SIGNIFICANT DISCREPANCIES EXIST BETWEEN ALIMONY DEDUCTIONS CLAIMED BY 
PAYERS AND INCOME REPORTED BY RECIPIENTS 4 (2014) [hereinafter TREASURY INSPECTOR]. The study 
examined tax returns from taxable year 2010. 
 9 Id. The study goes on to analyze whether the recipient filed a return or, whether properly or 
improperly, failed to file a return. In 84% of the discrepancy cases, the recipient filed a return but failed 
 
2018] A HUMAN CAPITAL THEORY OF ALIMONY AND TAX 353 
Service’s procedures for identifying and addressing the “alimony reporting 
compliance gap” as well as repeated failures by the Service to assess appli-
cable penalties for failing to identify the alimony recipient.10 In short, current 
law results in regular noncompliance and revenue loss. 
Compliance and administrative complexity could alone justify reform, 
yet the tax alimony regime also creates equity concerns. First, the complexity 
of the regime itself may undermine the equity of the tax system as individuals 
lose faith in a system that seems unintelligible or cannot be (or is not) uni-
formly enforced. Second, the tax alimony regime promotes inequity by its 
own terms. Well-advised taxpayers can, with the blessing of the current re-
gime, enlist the help of the federal government in subsidizing the costs of 
their alimony payments. If the alimony payor is in a higher tax bracket than 
the recipient (as is likely), the couple can use the availability of the deduction 
and difference in rates to their advantage as follows. A $10,000 alimony pay-
ment from a 39.6 percent bracket taxpayer to a 25 percent bracket taxpayer 
costs the payor only $6,040.11 The recipient will then pay $2,500 in tax on 
the alimony received.12 The difference in tax saved by the payor and collected 
from the recipient—$1,460—is the government subsidy for alimony paid. 
Because well-advised taxpayers whose divorce places them in separate 
brackets are the ones who are best situated to use the subsidy built into sec-
tion 71, the availability of such a subsidy inures to the benefit of those least 
likely to require it. And inequity follows such outcomes.  
That designing a regime to tax alimony is a challenge should not come 
as a surprise. Where tax law and cultural institutions such as the family col-
lide, complexity is rarely far behind. The deep and fascinating literature on 
the joint return and the relevance of marriage to tax law provides a ready 
example of such complexity.13 Alimony represents a similar collision of tax 
  
to claim alimony income. In 14%, the recipient improperly failed to file a return, and in the remaining 
2%, the author could not determine whether the income had been claimed because the recipient’s tax 
identification number was incorrect or not provided. Id. 
 10 Id. at 5–11. 
 11 The $10,000 deduction saves the payor $3,960 in tax (assuming the deduction does not move her 
from the 39.6% to the 35% bracket). Thus, her net cost is only $6,040. 
 12 Her tax reflects the inclusion of the $10,000 in income that is then taxed at a 25% rate. This 
simplified example also assumes that the additional income does not move the recipient into a new tax 
bracket.  
 13 For a discussion of the relevance of the family to tax, see Tessa R. Davis, Mapping the Families 
of the Internal Revenue Code, 22 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 179 (2015); Anthony C. Infanti, Decentralizing 
Family: An Inclusive Proposal for Individual Tax Filing in the United States, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 605, 
609, 645 (2010); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, and the 
Joint Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63, 104–09 (1993); James E. Maule, Tax and Marriage: 
Unhitching the Horse and the Carriage, 95 TAX NOTES TODAY 82-35 (Apr. 27, 1995). For a discussion 
of how the tax code differentially treated unmarried and same-sex couples pre–Windsor, see, e.g., Patricia 
A. Cain, Taxing Families Fairly, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 805, 805–06 (2008); Patricia A. Cain, Heter-
osexual Privilege and the Internal Revenue Code, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 465, 465–67 (2000); Lily Kahng, 
One Is the Loneliest Number: The Single Taxpayer in a Joint Return World, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 651, 651 
(2010); Nancy J. Knauer, Heteronormativity and Federal Tax Policy, 101 W. VA. L. REV. 129, 130–34 
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law and cultural concepts of family, duty, and support. As such, the tax treat-
ment of alimony faces similar complexity. In recent years, however, alimony 
has received little scholarly attention. Professor Deborah Geier’s excellent 
2002 Tax Lawyer article is the most authoritative scholarly call for change 
since the 1984 congressional reforms that gave us our transformed current 
legal framework.14 Yet sixteen years have passed since Professor Geier’s call 
to unify the tax treatment of transfers at divorce, and the area remains hard 
to administer and inequitable. Such a broken tax scheme should not continue 
to govern an area of law that impacts so many taxpayers.15 
A change is needed to remedy the problems of the current tax alimony 
regime. Family law provides a solution. Though family law has never settled 
on a unified theory of alimony,16 the diverse modern literature shares a com-
mon thread: investments of and in human capital create a right to alimony.17 
Alimony theory, alongside family law doctrine and practice, together suggest 
that what is labeled alimony can be better understood as one of three events: 
(1) a return on investment in human capital; (2) compensation for lost or 
damaged human capital; or (3) a property settlement.18 Respecting the third 
insight, if alimony and property settlements are largely indistinguishable, tax 
law should learn from family law and dissolve its own costly line in the sand. 
  
(1998); Theodore P. Seto, The Unintended Tax Advantages of Gay Marriage, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1529, 1529 (2008); Lawrence Zelenak, Doing Something About Marriage Penalties: A Guide for the Per-
plexed, 54 TAX L. REV. 1, 1–3 (2000). 
 14 Deborah A. Geier, Simplifying and Rationalizing the Federal Income Tax Law Applicable to 
Transfers in Divorce, 55 TAX LAW. 363, 363–66 (2002). 
 15 For U.S. Census Bureau data on marriage and divorce, see ROSE M. KREIDER & RENEE ELLIS, 
NUMBER, TIMING, AND DURATION OF MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES: 2009 1–2 (2011), 
https://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p70-125.pdf. However alimony rationales and awards have 
shifted, alimony persists. See, e.g., Laura W. Morgan, Where Are We Now? Current Trends in Alimony 
Law, 34 FAM. ADVOC. 8, 8–9 (2012) (“The economic, social, and cultural factors that have changed our 
views of marriage have shattered our once cohesive understanding of alimony. Some courts and commen-
tators, and even a few legislatures, have reasoned that since women now work, alimony should be curtailed 
drastically or even abolished. This trend was most recently exhibited in Massachusetts, where on Septem-
ber 26, 2011, the governor signed legislation, ending alimony when the payor retires, and generally lim-
iting alimony to a number of years based on the length of the marriage[.] Most states have not yet taken 
such a drastic step: alimony continues to stumble along, based on habit and precedent as much as logic, 
as part of the modern divorce case. . . . Our reluctance to abolish alimony entirely shows that at some 
level, in some cases, it must serve a very important purpose.”). Further, practitioner-focused materials 
emphasize the importance of the tax treatment of alimony in structuring divorce agreements, suggesting 
that the tax tail frequently wags the dog. See, e.g., Christopher C. Melcher, Simple Answers to Complex 
Alimony Questions, 27 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 61, 61–62 (2015) (“Every time an alimony agree-
ment or order is made, the attorneys are doing a form of tax planning. . . . When the payor is in a higher 
tax bracket than the payee, the IRS ends up subsidizing part of the alimony payment.”). 
 16 Cynthia Lee Starnes, Alimony Theory, 45 FAM. L.Q. 271, 291 (2011) (“Family law has operated 
for too long without a satisfactory and consistent theory of alimony. Over the last thirty years, numerous 
commentators have offered rationales for alimony, but none has won the day.”). 
 17 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 18 See, e.g., Starnes, supra note 16, at 272 (discussing how alimony serves as a substitute for settling 
and dividing nonexistent property holdings). 
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The first two insights help answer a question that prior reform attempts have 
largely avoided: to whom is alimony income? Specifically, this Article ar-
gues that family law theory supports recognizing a limited, theoretical con-
cept of basis in and of human capital—alimony basis—the existence of which 
calls into doubt whether alimony is clearly income to the recipient.  
This Article proposes unifying the tax treatment of transfers incident to 
divorce19 by repealing the deduction/inclusion regime of sections 71 and 215. 
The sections would be replaced by model statutory language for a no-deduc-
tion/exclusion regime. Under the new regime, all transfers, whether of cash 
or property, would remain in the tax base of the transferor and be excluded 
from the tax base of the recipient. Such unified treatment would boost com-
pliance, reduce inequities of the current law, and bring tax law more in line 
with substantive family law, creating a fairer, more coherent, more princi-
pled, and more administrable tax alimony regime.  
Part I provides background on the evolution of the tax treatment of ali-
mony and tax scholarship on alimony, making the case that a new approach 
to reform is necessary. Part II then explores family law theory, doctrine, and 
practice of alimony, identifying unifying themes and their import for tax law. 
Part III concludes by proposing the repeal of the current deduction/inclusion 
regime and setting forth multiple rationales for the suggested reform. 
I. A PERSISTENT CHALLENGE 
Arguments regarding the current tax treatment of alimony are as numer-
ous and varied as those on alimony itself. Doctrine varies from state to state, 
and just as family law scholars cannot agree on the justifications for alimony 
payments, tax scholars similarly debate the proper tax treatment of those pay-
ments. States are not alone in this challenge; many other countries, such as 
  
 19 In doing so, this Article is in line with earlier reform proposals in the literature. Though not based 
in human capital theories of alimony, those proposals will be explored infra Part II.B. The House Ways 
and Means Committee also proposed repealing the alimony deduction in 2014. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON 
WAYS & MEANS, 113TH CONG., TAX REFORM ACT OF 2014 DISCUSSION DRAFT SECTION-BY-SECTION 
SUMMARY 25–26 (Comm. Print 2014) (“Under the provision, alimony payments would not be deductible 
by the payor or includible in the income of the payee. The provision would be effective for any divorce 
decree or separation agreement executed after 2014 and to any modification after 2014 of any such instru-
ment executed before such date if expressly provided for by such modification. . . . The provision would 
eliminate what is effectively a ‘divorce subsidy’ under current law, in that a divorced couple can often 
achieve a better tax result for payments between them than a married couple can. The provision recognizes 
that the provision of spousal support as a consequence of a divorce or separation should have the same 
tax treatment as the provision of spousal support within the context of a married couple, as well as the 
provision of child support. . . . According to JCT, the provision would increase revenues by $5.5 billion 
over 2014-2023.”). See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 113TH CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF 
THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 2014, DISCUSSION DRAFT 63–64 (Comm. Print 2014) (stating a desire to return 
to Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917)). 
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Canada, Australia, and Germany, similarly struggle with the taxation of ali-
mony.20 Alimony, it seems, frustrates more than just those who must pay it.21  
Within the United States, the taxation of alimony has seen an evolution 
in fits and starts since the seminal Supreme Court case of Gould v. Gould.22 
Congress made significant changes first in 194223 and then again in 1984,24 
and legislative interest in the tax treatment of alimony persists. Former Re-
publican Chair of the House Ways and Means Committee David Camp ad-
vocated repealing the alimony deduction as part of the proposed Tax Reform 
Act of 2014.25 As recently as June 2016, Republican Congressman Lloyd 
Dodgett from Texas discussed reforming how alimony is reported,26 suggest-
ing legislation that would impose a Form 1099–type regime27 for alimony 
  
 20 Prior to 1995, Canadian law allowed a deduction to the payor for both alimony and support pay-
ments but then switched its regime to mirror the United States’ differing treatment of alimony and child 
support. Australian law, in contrast to that of the United States, keeps both alimony and child support in 
the tax base of the payor. Germany takes a slightly different tack, denying a deduction for both types of 
payments but providing limited tax breaks for the payor via credits. For further discussion of the taxation 
of alimony in these and other countries, see HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME 
TAXATION: A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 323–28 (3d ed. 2010). 
 21 Campaigns to abolish specific types of alimony or alimony entirely arise in many states. See, e.g., 
L.J. Jackson, Alimony Arithmetic: More States Are Looking at Formulas to Regulate Spousal Support, 
ABA J. (Feb. 2012), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/alimony_arithmetic_more_states_are_ 
looking_at_formulas_to_regulate_spousal. In South Carolina, an entire organization exists to modernize 
South Carolina’s alimony laws. SOUTH CAROLINA ALIMONY REFORM (2018), http://www.scalimonyre-
form.com/. The organization’s website states: “We are a state of South Carolina non-profit association 
dedicated to modernizing the outdated alimony laws of South Carolina. We are looking for people just 
like you that would like to join us in our effort. If you feel that the alimony laws in South Carolina are 
unfair and unjust in today’s society, please join us and help us update these archaic laws. We are seeking 
to change permanent alimony to limited duration alimony with a safety valve for those that really need it 
due to physical or mental disabilities.” Id.  
 22 245 U.S. 151 (1917). 
 23 Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, § 120, 56 Stat. 798 (1942) (codified as amended at 26 
U.S.C. §§ 22(k), 23(u) (1942)). 
 24 Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1984). 
 25 See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 113TH CONG., TAX REFORM ACT OF 2014 
DISCUSSION DRAFT SECTION-BY-SECTION SUMMARY 25–26 (Comm. Print 2014); STAFF OF JOINT 
COMM. ON TAX’N, 113TH CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 2014, 
DISCUSSION DRAFT 63 (Comm. Print 2014); Simplified USA Tax Act of 2001, H.R. 86, 107th Cong. 
(2001) (Rep. English introduced legislation that would leave alimony deductible and make child support 
deductible.). Rep. English introduced similar legislation until he left the House in 2008. 
 26 Currently, the individual claiming an alimony deduction must provide the recipient’s Social Se-
curity number or ITIN. The recipient must then report alimony received on his Form 1040. IRS 
PUBLICATION 504, DIVORCED OR SEPARATED INDIVIDUALS (2017), https://www.irs.gov/publica-
tions/p504/ar02.html#en_US_2016_publink1000175944. 
 27 Form 1099 is part of what is known as information reporting. For a discussion of information 
reporting, see Leandra Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps to Reduce the Tax Gap: When Is Infor-
mation Reporting Warranted?, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1733, 1736 (2010) (“Information reporting is a 
prime example of a technique used to solve both types of information asymmetries at the prefiling stage. 
Withholding is well known to be highly effective in ensuring payment, but IRS data show that information 
reporting in the absence of withholding is almost as effective. With information reporting, the government 
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income.28 However, no reform proposal has gained much traction since the 
more comprehensive reforms of the 1980s.29 A brief introduction to the path 
toward the current regime provides the background necessary to evaluate the 
current regime and reforms proposed by this Article.  
A. A Timeline of the Tax Treatment of Alimony  
Tracking the development of the tax treatment of alimony since 1913 
helps illustrate the muddled relationship between tax and family law concepts 
of alimony. At points, Congress, the courts, and the Service have looked to 
family law to define alimony to understand how the payments should be clas-
sified under tax law—specifically, to answer the question of to whom an al-
imony payment is income.30 At other times, Congress reformed the tax 
  
obtains information about the taxpayer’s tax situation from a third party and—equally important—the 
taxpayer knows that the government has the information.”). 
 28 The details of Rep. Dodgett’s proposal were, as of this writing, unclear. See Alan K. Ota, How 
Improving Tax Filings on Alimony Could Help Foster Kids, CQ ROLL CALL (June 6, 2016), https://dog-
gett.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/how-improving-tax-filings-alimony-could-help-foster-kids. 
 29 The Trump Administration has not signaled interest in reviewing or reforming the tax treatment 
of alimony, instead focusing its (albeit limited) proposals on tax rates and the corporate tax. However, the 
Administration’s proposed lowering of the highest marginal rate from 39.6% to 33% and compression of 
the rate schedule from seven rates to three further distances the current law from historic justifications for 
a payor deduction. See infra Part III.A.3. 
 30 Professor Geier discusses this substantive inquiry, ultimately advancing the idea that we can con-
cede that alimony is income and need only determine to which of the former spouses it should be taxed. 
This approach views the divorced couple as a unit, rather than two separate individuals. She writes:  
Notice that this form of analysis focuses on whether alimony comes within some notion of “income.” If 
the analysis is viewed this way, each party is analyzed independently, and a payment of alimony could 
conceivably be taxable to both the payor and the recipient. For example, if we view the matter from the 
recipient’s side alone, and if alimony is considered within the [Comm’r v.] Glenshaw Glass [Co., 348 U.S. 
426 (1955)] notion of “income” as an undeniable accession to wealth, etc., then it would be includable by 
the recipient. At the same time, the payor earning wages from which the alimony was paid would have to 
include the wages in gross income, since compensation for services rendered is specifically listed as “in-
come” in section 61(a)(1). Moreover, the payor would arguably be denied a deduction for the payment 
under a strict definition of “income” in the familiar Schanz-Haig-Simons sense, under which only outlays 
incurred to produce includable income are properly deductible (with personal consumption outlays being 
nondeductible, and thus taxed). . . .  
[T]here is another way to view this issue, which was also hinted at by the Gould Court and which is, I 
think, the more appropriate way to think about the payment. Rather than analyzing the tax consequences 
to each of these taxpayers independently of the other, i.e., determining whether the receipt qualifies as 
“income” to the recipient and whether the payment qualifies as a deductible one to the payor under an 
“income” analysis because it does not purchase discretionary personal consumption, we could view both 
taxpayers together. In an intact marriage, by analogy, amounts earned by one spouse and paid to another 
are ignored for tax purposes (i.e., they are neither includable by the recipient nor deductible by the payor), 
whether or not the couple files a joint return or files separate returns using the rate schedule for married 
couples filing separately. Therefore, the amounts are taxed only once between the two. We could reason 
that the amounts should continue to be taxed only once, even though the family is no longer intact, because 
of the clear and direct relationship of the payments to the former legal relationship of the parties (or the 
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treatment of alimony in ways that seemed unconcerned with understanding 
the proper tax treatment of the payments in favor of advancing other goals.31 
In vacillating between aspiring to have tax alimony track the family law un-
derstanding of what alimony is, and letting such substantive consistency lose 
out to other goals, Congress has created an area of tax law that does a poor 
job of being either coherent or administrable.  
1. Gould v. Gould 
The Supreme Court opinion in Gould v. Gould32 set early precedent on 
the tax treatment of alimony. The case also made clear the influence of social 
norms and expectations on the interpretation of laws governing marriage and 
divorce.33 In Gould, the Court considered whether monthly payments Mrs. 
Gould received from her husband, pursuant to a 1909 divorce decree, quali-
fied as income under the then-new income tax.34 Citing its own precedent 
from a 1901 bankruptcy discharge case, the Court stated:  
Alimony does not arise from any business transaction, but from the relation of marriage. It is 
not founded on contract, express or implied, but on the natural and legal duty of the husband 
to support the wife. The general obligation to support is made specific by the decree of the 
court of appropriate jurisdiction. . . . Permanent alimony is regarded rather as a portion of the 
  
continuing legal relationship, in the case of a paternity payment to support a child after a divorce or oth-
erwise outside of marriage). . . . Viewed this way, the question is not whether the amount conceptually 
constitutes “income” to both but rather who should be taxed on what is concededly income to someone? 
That is to say, the question can be viewed not as “what is income?” but rather as “to whom should the 
income be taxed?”  
Geier, supra note 14, at 368–70. 
 31 For example, legislative history shows that Congress was motivated, at least in part, by ability-
to-pay concerns for payers of alimony when marginal rates were much higher than under current law. See 
H.R. REP. NO. 77-2333, at 46 (1942) (“The existing law does not tax alimony payments to the wife who 
receives them, nor does it allow the husband to take any deduction on account of alimony payments made 
by him. He is fully taxable on his entire net income even though a large portion of his income goes to his 
wife as alimony or as separate maintenance payments. The increased surtax rates would intensify this 
hardship and in many cases the husband would not have sufficient income left after paying alimony to 
meet his income tax obligations.”). 
 32 245 U.S. 151 (1917).  
 33 The thrust of the Gould case is that the woman is essentially incapable of caring for herself. In an 
era when less than 25% of women participated in the workforce, it is not surprising that the Court would 
view a man’s support of his wife as “natural” and persisting after marriage. Gould, 245 U.S. at 153. See 
also Carol Boyd Leon, The Life of American Workers in 1915, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (2016), 
https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2016/article/the-life-of-american-workers-in-1915.htm (“The 1920 census 
shows that, among people ages 14 and older, the proportion of the population that was in the total labor 
force was 85 percent for men and 23 percent for women in January of that year. (Civilian labor force data 
by gender are not available for 1915.)”). When women participated in market work, their wages were only 
63% of men’s wages. James P. Smith & Michael P. Ward, Women’s Wages and Work in the Twentieth 
Century, RAND viii (1984), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2007/R3119.pdf. 
 34 Gould, 245 U.S. at 152. 
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husband’s estate to which the wife is equitably entitled, than as strictly a debt; alimony from 
time to time may be regarded as a portion of his current income or earnings.35 
In the Court’s view, alimony was a husband’s payment of a financial 
responsibility owed to the wife—essentially, payment of a wife’s vested in-
terest in support.36 Because such support would not have been taxed to the 
wife during the marriage, it remained untaxed after divorce.37 The Court also 
appealed to the property settlement rationale. By stating that alimony is a 
“portion of the husband’s estate,” the Court suggested that alimony is not 
only a share of earnings owed to the wife by the husband but also akin to 
marital property in which the wife has a vested interest.38 Alimony, then, was 
not merely a pure transfer of earned income from husband to wife but also a 
divvying up of property.39 Importantly, this muddled sense of what alimony 
is echoed in family law scholarship and subsequent court cases.40 Ultimately, 
  
 35 Id. at 153. As Professor Geier notes, the Court was operating with a different canon of interpre-
tation in deciding whether Ms. Gould had income. In contrast to the broad interpretation of “income” 
advanced in Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955), the Gould Court stated that “[i]n case 
of doubt [tax laws] are construed most strongly against the Government, and in favor of the citizen.” 
Gould, 245 U.S. at 153; Geier, supra note 14, at 367. In Glenshaw Glass, the Supreme Court articulated 
the still-dominant judicial definition of gross income, defining it as “accessions to wealth, clearly realized, 
and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion.” Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 431. In that same 
case, the Court also established that the definition of income should be broadly construed. Id. at 431–33. 
 36 See Gould, 245 U.S. at 153.  
 37 The income tax in force at the time did not tax transfers between spouses. See Underwood Tariff 
Act, Pub. L. No. 63-16, 38 Stat. 114 (1913).  
 38 Gould, 245 U.S. at 153.  
 39 Id. at 153–54. 
 40 Courts frequently consider the totality of the agreement in evaluating the sufficiency of a property 
settlement or alimony, suggesting that the line between property division and alimony is not firm in courts’ 
views. See, e.g., Haldeman v. Haldeman, 21 Cal. Rptr. 75, 82 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962), where a California 
court found that the property division seemed inadequate to justify increasing alimony. “She was awarded 
the custody of the 16-year-old daughter and with the responsibility of caring for her appellant should not 
be compelled to seek outside employment.” Id. (citing Mueller v. Mueller, 301 P.2d 90 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1956)).  
Appellant was awarded community property of a value of $144,964.57, of which approximately $110,000 
is now, or can be diverted into, income-earning property. How this compares with the value of the property 
ultimately to be awarded to the husband depends upon the ultimate determination of the value of the 
community interest in the pharmacy business. An alimony award is a comparative matter. For emphasis 
we quote again from Civil Code section 139 that it should be a ‘suitable allowance . . . having regard for 
the circumstances of the respective parties[.] . . .’ The financial position of each of the parties before and 
after the divorce should be compared and contrasted.  
Id. (citing Huntington v. Huntington, 262 P.2d 104 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953)).  
If the husband (who is here the guilty spouse) is to be awarded the pharmacy business, which presently 
without his too constant services nets him $41,000 a year, plus the income . . . from property worth 
$81,423.71 (or so much thereof as may be income producing) his circumstamces [sic] will be rather good.  
The circumstances of the wife (who is the innocent spouse) suffer by comparison. The property heretofore 
awarded to her is unlikely to yield, safely invested, more than $5,500 a year—appoximately [sic] $460 a 
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drawing on both understandings of the substance of alimony, the Court held 
that such payments were nondeductible to the payor and excludible by the 
recipient.41  
2. Pre-1984 Law 
Gould and its no-deduction/exclusion regime remained law until 1942. 
In that year, Congress overruled Gould in the Revenue Act of 1942, which 
made alimony payments deductible to the payor and included in income by 
the recipient.42 Tax rates, rather than a considered analysis of what alimony 
is in substance, drove the change.43 In that year, the highest marginal tax rate 
was 88 percent on taxable income over $200,000.44 Such high marginal rates 
drove the concern, articulated in the legislative history of the Act, that pay-
ment of alimony without a deduction could effectively bankrupt the man who 
paid it:  
He [the payor] is fully taxable on his entire net income even though a large portion of his 
income goes to his wife as alimony or as separate maintenance payments. The increased surtax 
rates would intensify this hardship and in many cases the husband would not have sufficient 
income left after paying alimony to meet his income tax obligations.45  
Tax alimony shifted then, in part, because of congressional concern for 
the payor’s ability to pay.46 However, the desire to reduce the tax burden of 
high marginal rates gave rise to complexity.47 Though Congress felt shifting 
the tax liability for alimony payments to the recipient was proper, it kept child 
  
month. This does not seem ‘suitable.’ All of these are matters which should be considered by the trial 
court.  
Id. at 82–83 (citing Brawman v. Brawman, 19 Cal. Rptr. 106 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962)). 
 41 Gould, 245 U.S. at 153–54. 
 42 Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, § 120, 56 Stat. 798, 816–17 (1942) (codified as 
amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 22(k), 23(u) (1942)). 
 43 See H.R. REP. NO. 77-2333, at 1–2 (1942); Geier, supra note 14, at 371–72; Note, Alimony Tax-
ation of Indirect Benefits: A Critique and a Proposal, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1118 (1966) (“The un-
fairness of denying a deduction for this substantial expense became evident during the first years of World 
War II when alimony payments and increased taxes threatened to exceed the annual income of some 
husbands.”). 
 44 SOI Tax Stats—Historical Table 23, IRS.GOV, https://www.irs.gov/uac/soi-tax-stats-historical-
table-23 (follow “Table 23” hyperlink) (last visited May 1, 2018). 
 45 Geier, supra note 14, at 371–72 (citing and discussing H.R. REP. NO. 77-2333 (1942)). 
 46 Ability to pay is the idea that as an individual’s income increases, so too does her ability to pay 
taxes. The concept undergirds our system of progressive taxation. For a discussion of the concept of ability 
to pay, see LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE 20–30 
(2002). 
 47 See, e.g., Geier, supra note 14, at 363–64.  
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support payments under the old no-deduction/exclusion regime.48 In so do-
ing, it created the need to differentiate between child support and alimony, 
which led to potential gaming.49  
Distinguishing between child support and alimony thus became a sig-
nificant challenge. Section 22(k) (a predecessor to parts of current section 
71) stated that any amounts “fixed” for child support remained in the tax base 
of the payor.50 Disputes then arose over whether an amount was or was not 
fixed as child support, leading to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Commis-
sioner v. Lester.51 The Court articulated the “Lester rule,” holding that unless 
the divorce agreement expressly stated that an amount paid was for child 
support, then that amount could not be treated as child support.52 Even 
  
 48 See id. at 372 (“The legislative history is silent with respect to why Congress chose to shift the 
tax incidence to the recipient only with respect to alimony and not child support. Yet, we can perhaps 
guess the predominant thinking of the time. In this more traditional era—when it was, indeed, only hus-
bands who paid alimony and child support—it might have been thought that, while shifting the tax obli-
gation with respect to alimony would help to alleviate the immediate and quite practical problem of a 
husband being unable to satisfy both his alimony and tax liability if alimony were not deductible, shifting 
the tax obligation with respect to the man’s children would be going too far. A man’s financial obligation 
to his children—including the obligation to pay the income tax on amounts spent to support them—might 
have been considered to be stronger than that to his ex-wife. In any event, this new distinction between 
alimony and child support necessarily required line-drawing for the first time.”). 
 49 Though the Eleventh Circuit was not considering current law, its opinion in Strealdorf v. Comm’r, 
726 F.2d 1521 (11th Cir. 1984) illustrates this lack of substantive division that taxpayers used to their 
advantage. “Strealdorf was able to take advantage of an IRS rule which treats mixed payments as all 
alimony regardless of the true nature of the payments.” Strealdorf, 726 F.2d at 1522 (citing Brock v. 
Comm’r, 566 F.2d 947 (5th Cir. 1978) (emphasis added)). 
 50 Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, § 120, 56 Stat. 798, 816–17 (1942) (codified as 
amended at 26 U.S.C. § 22(k) (1942)) (“[P]eriodic payments . . . received [by the wife] subsequent to [a 
decree of divorce] . . . in discharge of . . . a legal obligation which, because of the marital or family 
relationship, is imposed upon or incurred by such husband . . . under a written instrument incident to such 
divorce . . . shall be includible in the gross income of such wife . . . . This subsection shall not apply to 
that part of any such periodic payment which the terms of the . . . written instrument fix, in terms of . . . a 
portion of the payment, as a sum which is payable for the support of minor children of such husband.”). 
 51 366 U.S. 299 (1961). 
 52 Id. at 303–04 (quoting Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 378 (1930)) (“This language leaves no 
room for doubt. The agreement must expressly specify or ‘fix’ a sum certain or percentage of the payment 
for child support before any of the payment is excluded from the wife’s income. The statutory requirement 
is strict and carefully worded. It does not say that ‘a sufficiently clear purpose’ on the part of the parties 
is sufficient to shift the tax. It says that the ‘written instrument’ must ‘fix’ that ‘portion of the payment’ 
which is to go to the support of the children. Otherwise, the wife must pay the tax on the whole payment. 
We are obliged to enforce this mandate of the Congress. One of the basic precepts of the income tax law 
is that ‘[t]he income that is subject to a man’s unfettered command and that he is free to enjoy at his own 
option may be taxed to him as his income, whether he sees fit to enjoy it or not.’”)). “Under the type of 
agreement here, the wife is free to spend the monies paid under the agreement as she sees fit.” Lester, 366 
U.S. at 304. “‘The power to dispose of income is the equivalent of ownership of it.’” Id. (quoting Helver-
ing v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 118 (1940)). “Including the entire payments in the wife’s gross income under 
such circumstances, therefore, comports with the underlying philosophy of the Code. And, as we have 
frequently stated, the Code must be given ‘as great an internal symmetry and consistency as its words 
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reducing the payment amount when a child reaches the age of majority would 
fail the Lester rule and, as such, be deductible to the payor and included by 
the recipient,53 despite the reduction suggesting that the pre-reduction pay-
ment was, at least in part, for the child.54 
With the Lester rule, the Court traded substance for simplicity, creating 
a strong dividing line between child support and alimony based on form. This 
gave taxpayers the option to determine the tax consequences of their divorce 
payments and to plan accordingly.55 A taxpayer needed only to “fix” a pay-
ment to elect the no-deduction/exclusion if that regime better suited his tax 
goals. The Lester rule no longer applies, but such private ordering remains in 
current law, as discussed below.  
3. Current Section 71 
Current law classifies payments as alimony if they satisfy five require-
ments.56 “Tax alimony”57 is “any payment:” (1) made in cash; (2) to or for a 
spouse;58 (3) provided for in a divorce or separation agreement; (4) not spe-
cifically designated as being nondeductible to the payor and excludable by 
the recipient; and (5) for which there is no requirement that payments be 
made after the death of the recipient.59 There is no requirement that the pay-
ments be substantively classified as alimony by the family law of the gov-
erning state.60 There is an affirmative requirement, however, that the 
  
permit.’” Lester, 366 U.S. at 304 (quoting United States v. Olympic Radio & Television, 349 U.S. 232, 
236 (1955)). 
 53 Lester, 366 U.S. at 304–06. 
 54 Under current law, such a change in the amount of the payment would lead to section 71(c)(2) 
classification as child support.  
 55 Geier, supra note 14, at 375. 
 56 26 U.S.C. § 71 (2012). Subsection (b) provides the substantive requirements. Those requirements 
are then subject to further qualification by subsequent subsections.  
 57 This Article uses the term tax alimony to underscore that whether a set of payments is treated as 
alimony for tax purposes is not wholly dependent on whether it is viewed substantively as alimony under 
the relevant state’s law. As such, tax has created its own concept of alimony. 
 58 See, e.g., 26 C.F.R. § 1.71-1T Q6 (“[C]ash payments of rent, mortgage, tax, or tuition liabilities 
of the payee spouse made under the terms of the divorce or separation instrument will qualify as alimony 
or separate maintenance payments. Any payments to maintain property owned by the payor spouse and 
used by the payee spouse (including mortgage payments, real estate taxes and insurance premiums) are 
not payments on behalf of a spouse even if those payments are made pursuant to the terms of the divorce 
or separation instrument.”). 
 59 26 U.S.C. § 71(b) (2012). Subsections (c), (e), and (f) impose further limitations and require-
ments, but the five elements of subsection (b) make-up the core of the definition.   
 60 The fact that federal income tax law classification differs from state law classification is not, 
itself, remarkable. There is no requirement that federal tax law and state law be always in agreement. This 
Article argues that it is, however, problematic herein. Professor Joseph Dodge engages in a similar project 
in discussing a potential rationale for the section 104(a)(2) personal injury exclusion. Joseph M. Dodge, 
Taxes and Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 143, 144–55 (1992) (“This Article deals only tangentially with 
current doctrinal issues under section 104. Its main purpose is to examine whether tax policy, alone or in 
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payments be neither formally, nor substantively, child support.61 The Lester 
rule, which required formal “fixing” of a payment as support, has been ex-
changed for a test that looks to whether a payment seems to be child support. 
For example, if a payment is reduced upon a child turning eighteen, the 
amount of the reduction may be classified as child support rather than ali-
mony.62 Lastly, subsection (f) attempts to root out payments that are, in sub-
stance, property settlements through its mechanical “excess alimony” test.63 
Taken together, the “tax alimony” requirements illustrate that the tax concept 
of alimony is only loosely moored to the family law concept of alimony.  
Despite this loose mooring to state family law, determining whether a 
payment is alimony frequently relies on applying state law. Individuals still 
regularly find themselves in court disputing the tax classification of a pay-
ment based on one factor: whether the payments in question end upon the 
death of the recipient.64 Thus, when disputes arise over the characterization 
of support payments, state law, not federal tax law, will frequently be the 
deciding factor. The taxation of alimony both embraces and rejects the idea 
of getting it “right”—where “right” means that a payment’s tax classification 
tracks the relevant state law’s understanding of the substance of the payment. 
  
conjunction with policies of tort law, justifies the exclusion of any component of a personal injury recov-
ery. Past attempts to justify the exclusion have been insufficient, leading some commentators to call for 
its repeal. This Article argues that the inclusion-exclusion dichotomy is a misleading way to frame the 
issue. Resolution of this issue should be sensitive to both federal tax policy and state tort policies.”).  
 61 26 U.S.C. § 71(c) (2012). 
 62 Id. Note that the language of “fix[ing]” payments remains, but the section itself provides exam-
ples of facts that suggest fixing even in the absence of express language.  
For purposes of paragraph (1), if any amount specified in the instrument will be reduced (A) on the hap-
pening of a contingency specified in the instrument relating to a child (such as attaining a specified age, 
marrying, dying, leaving school, or a similar contingency), or (B) at a time which can clearly be associated 
with a contingency of a kind specified in subparagraph (A), an amount equal to the amount of such reduc-
tion will be treated as an amount fixed as payable for the support of children of the payor spouse.  
Id. 
 63 26 U.S.C. § 71(f) (2012). The IRS provides a helpful example of the computation of excess ali-
mony in Publication 504 (2016). The mechanistic rule seeks out reductions in alimony payments over the 
first three years of payments. If, for example, an individual pays $50,000 of alimony in postseparation 
year one, followed by $39,000 in year two, and $28,000 in year three, $1,500 will be recaptured as excess 
alimony, which will then be included by the payor spouse and deductible by the recipient spouse. Internal 
Revenue Service, Publication 504: Divorced or Separated Individuals 18 (2016), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p504.pdf. 
 64 See infra Part II.A. The termination-at-death requirement is understood as a key point of distinc-
tion between support payments and property settlements. This article accepts that the termination-at-death 
requirement has served that purpose but focuses more on the nature of the behavior that gives right to the 
continued support payments. Termination at death has a clear correlation to support statements—once 
deceased, an individual requires no further support—but is not and need not be determinative. A savvy 
taxpayer may include the termination-at-death requirement for payments that are known to all parties to 
be property settlements in alimony’s clothing. For a critique of alimony termination rules, see Cynthia 
Lee Starnes, One More Time: Alimony, Intuition, and the Remarriage-Termination Rule, 81 IND. L.J. 971, 
976 (2006). As will be addressed infra Part II.B, close examination of alimony theory further reveals that 
the distinction between alimony and property settlement is hard to define.  
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Straddling this line results in a code provision that is subject to abuse, gener-
ates unnecessary complexity, and results in reduced compliance and revenue 
loss.65  
Sections 215 and 1041 act alongside section 71 to complete the statutory 
scheme governing transfers at and incident to divorce. Section 215 authorizes 
the payor’s deduction for alimony payments paid,66 cross-referencing section 
71 for the definition of alimony payments.67 Section 1041 governs transfers 
of property during marriage and incident to divorce, setting up what is known 
in tax law as a nonrecognition rule.68 In effect, any transfers made by one 
former spouse to another former spouse that are “incident to the divorce” are 
ignored.69 The result of the rule is that such transfers are nondeductible to the 
payor and excludible by the recipient.70 Because section 71 is the lynchpin of 
the tax alimony regime, it is the point of focus for reform.  
  
 65 See infra Part II.A.3.d; IRS Releases New Tax Gap Estimates, IRS.GOV, 
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-releases-new-tax-gap-estimates-compliance-rates-remain-statisti-
cally-unchanged-from-previous-study (last visited Mar. 30, 2018). 
 66 26 U.S.C. § 215(a) (2012) (“In the case of an individual, there shall be allowed as a deduction an 
amount equal to the alimony or separate maintenance payments paid during such individual’s taxable 
year.”)  
 67 Id. § 215(b) (“For purposes of this section, the term ‘alimony or separate maintenance payment’ 
means any alimony or separate maintenance payment (as defined in section 71(b)) which is includible in 
the gross income of the recipient under section 71.”). A payor is also required to include the Social Secu-
rity or tax identification number of the recipient on his or her Form 1040. 
 68 Id. § 1041. Section 1041 will govern if a transfer fails to meet the definition of tax alimony or the 
couple exercises the elective aspect of section 71 by stating that the alimony paid is nondeductible/ex-
cludible. Simply stating that a payment is not tax alimony removes it from the alimony regime even if, in 
substance, that payment is alimony. See also 26 U.S.C. § 71(b)(1)(B) (2012) (“[T]he divorce or separation 
instrument does not designate such payment as a payment which is not includible in gross income under 
this section and not allowable as a deduction under section 215.”).  
 69 26 U.S.C. § 1041(c) (2012) (“For purposes of subsection (a)(2), a transfer of property is incident 
to the divorce if such transfer (1) occurs within 1 year after the date on which the marriage ceases, or (2) 
is related to the cessation of the marriage.”); see also 26 C.F.R. § 1.1041-1T (“A transfer of property is 
treated as related to the cessation of the marriage if the transfer is pursuant to a divorce or separation 
instrument, as defined in section 71(b)(2), and the transfer occurs not more than 6 years after the date on 
which the marriage ceases. A divorce or separation instrument includes a modification or amendment to 
such decree or instrument. Any transfer not pursuant to a divorce or separation instrument and any transfer 
occurring more than 6 years after the cessation of the marriage is presumed to be not related to the cessa-
tion of the marriage. This presumption may be rebutted only by showing that the transfer was made to 
effect the division of property owned by the former spouses at the time of the cessation of the marriage. 
For example, the presumption may be rebutted by showing that (a) the transfer was not made within the 
one- and six-year periods described above because of factors which hampered an earlier transfer of the 
property, such as legal or business impediments to transfer or disputes concerning the value of the property 
owned at the time of the cessation of the marriage, and (b) the transfer is effected promptly after the 
impediment to transfer is removed.”). 
 70 26 U.S.C. § 1041 (2012). If a former spouse transfers property rather than cash, section 1041 sets 
out basis rules that place the recipient spouse in the payor’s shoes. For example, assume Laura and Angela 
are married. Pursuant to their divorce agreement, Angela transfers Blackacre, worth $80,000, which she 
holds with a basis of $50,000. Section 1041 gives Laura Angela’s $50,000 basis.  
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B. Analyzing the Current Regime 
The current deduction/inclusion regime is a reasonable scheme to en-
dorse. Taxing the recipient appeals to the sense that alimony seems to be 
income to the recipient. After all, the recipient, who ultimately controls the 
disposal of the received alimony, seems to have realized an accession to 
wealth.71 The dominant definition of income, articulated in Glenshaw Glass,72  
views control as a defining aspect of income itself—a taxpayer must have 
“dominion” over an “accession to wealth” to have income .73 Severing the 
definition of tax alimony from any required coherence with the family law 
concept of alimony also keeps the Service within its area of expertise. When 
the Code requires only a superficial resemblance to alimony, the Service need 
not enter the business of analyzing the substance of a payment using family 
law principles. Scholars have appealed to these and other rationales support-
ing the current regime or different iterations of that regime. Though many of 
the proposals have merit, this Article argues that reconciling tax and family 
law alimony provides the best solution to the challenges of the current regime 
because doing so helps address one of key weaknesses of prior reform pro-
posals: the tendency to avoid the question of to whom alimony is income.  
1. Proposed Reforms  
In perhaps the most comprehensive discussion of the tax treatment of 
transfers at and incident to divorce, Professor Deborah Geier articulates the 
common themes of calls for reform: unification, assumption of the unit, and 
private ordering. Specifically, Geier argues that all cash payments made in-
cident to divorce should be deductible to the payor and included by the re-
cipient.74 Adopting Geier’s new section 71 would remove the line in the sand 
separating alimony, child support, and property settlements satisfied with 
cash, thereby unifying the tax treatment of payments incident to divorce.75 
The new section 71 would be only a default rule because Geier would ex-
pressly allow private ordering by permitting taxpayers to elect into a no-de-
duction/exclusion regime if they prefer.76  
Geier’s proposal relies on understanding the government as a “mere 
stakeholder” with no vested interest in to whom the income is taxed.77 Geier 
  
 71 Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).  
 72 Id. 
 73 See id.; Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 119 (1940). 
 74 Geier, supra note 14, at 439. An earlier proposal by Professor Laurie Malman also allowed for a 
degree of private ordering. Professor Malman noted the difficulty of line-drawing in this area and appealed 
to family law principles for guidance. Laurie Malman, Unfinished Reform: The Tax Consequences of Di-
vorce, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 363 (1986). 
 75 Geier, supra note 14, at 439.  
 76 Id. at 431. 
 77 Id. 
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adopts this position by viewing the couple as a unit rather than two separate 
individuals.78 By adopting the unit view, Geier argues, we need not “query 
whether the amounts paid out constitute ‘income’ to the payor and payee.”79 
Describing this approach as a “pragmatic paradigm,” Geier states that the 
payment is “concededly income to someone,” thereby avoiding the compli-
cated question of to whom it is most appropriately taxed.80  
The relevance of the unit view at this point is twofold. First, it supports 
the view that the income should be taxed only once.81 Because interspousal 
transfers are ignored for tax purposes, income, while shared in a marriage, is 
taxed only once.82 Second, continuing to view the divorced couple as a unit 
enables the couple to capture some of the value of the rate disparity between 
the now-separate filers.83 Both outcomes play a role in supporting the pro-
posed no-deduction/exclusion regime, as will be explored in Part III.84  
Other scholars draw on these same themes. Some would tax alimony to 
the payor spouse by default, but only if the payor is in a higher tax bracket.85 
Others would unify the treatment of child support and alimony but provide a 
credit rather than a deduction, thereby attempting to limit the benefits of the 
de facto election in current law.86 Still other scholars want similar unification 
but ground their rationales in the argument that the payments are most clearly 
  
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Geier, supra note 14, at 370 (“We could reason that the amounts should continue to be taxed only 
once, even though the family is no longer intact, because of the clear and direct relationship of the pay-
ments to the former legal relationship of the parties (or the continuing legal relationship, in the case of a 
paternity payment to support a child after a divorce or otherwise outside of marriage). These payments 
would not have been made but for the prior legal relationship. Unless the government wishes to discourage 
divorce affirmatively via the tax laws (a very unwise choice, in my view), there does not seem to be a 
persuasive reason to tax such payments more onerously outside marriage (by taxing them twice) than 
within it (by taxing them once).”).  
 82 Id. As Geier notes, the assertion is true whether the couple files jointly or separately.  
 83 Id. at 364–65 (“I would argue that such tax arbitrage is built into the current system already, that 
people do not get divorced in order to engage in income-shifting for tax purposes, and that the income-
shifting that can occur is likely a good and defensible outcome on public policy grounds in most situations 
in which it can occur. Such income-shifting encourages the higher-bracket spouse to transfer funds to the 
lower-bracket spouse (presumably the more needy spouse), often leaving the lower-bracket spouse with 
more after-tax income than she would otherwise have if income-shifting were disallowed. Unlike other 
situations in which income-shifting is deemed to be inappropriate, such as in the intact family or in the 
case of a closely held corporation, divorce is not a transaction that can be entered into lightly, and often, 
in order to shift income to another in a lower tax bracket and thus reduce overall taxes on a routine basis 
while retaining effective control over the shifted income. Indeed, ‘[f]ollowing divorce, the chances of 
filing bankruptcy triple.’ To the extent that some additional income-shifting would occur under the pro-
posed simplifications that does not already occur under the current rules, so be it.”) (emphasis added). 
 84 See infra Part III.  
 85 Emily Cauble, Tax Elections: How to Live with Them If We Can’t Live Without Them, 53 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 421, 470–71 (2013). 
 86 Wendy Gerzog Shaller, On Public Policy Grounds, a Limited Tax Credit for Child Support and 
Alimony, 11 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 321, 321–22 (1994). 
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income to the recipient.87 While the specific solutions may differ, the consist-
encies that underlie the different proposals are important. All call for some 
degree of unification in the treatment of transfers incident to divorce; all 
agree that distinguishing among property settlements, child support, and ali-
mony is extremely difficult; and all adopt some form of the unit view.88 
Scholars are right to call for unification and to adopt the unit view of a di-
vorced couple. The proposed reform detailed in Part III shares both aspects 
with earlier reform proposals. Where the current literature errs, however, is 
in permitting private ordering and either assuming alimony payments are 
clearly income to the recipient or altogether avoiding the question of to whom 
alimony is income. 
2. Failings of Current Law and the Need for New Action 
A complex tax provision or regime such as that of sections 71, 215, and 
1041 is not inherently bad policy. Often, complexity arises or is required to 
achieve accuracy in classifying a given transaction or to achieve some desired 
sense of fairness in tax outcomes.89 The complexity of the tax alimony regime 
is unwarranted and unproductive. It is also costly to taxpayers who attempt 
to comply with the regime, courts whose time is spent on similar cases year 
after year, and the fisc, whose coffers are lower from extensive noncompli-
ance with the regime.90 Lastly, it is a regime that results in inequity on mul-
tiple fronts. In short, the current taxation of transfers tied to divorce remains 
ripe for reform, and a new approach is needed to achieve that reform. What 
follows is greater detail on the weaknesses of the current regime, providing 
the necessary background to illustrate how the proposed reform improves on 
current law. 
a. Unprincipled Complexity and Its Compliance Costs 
Thirty years after the last reform effort, individuals continue to find 
themselves in court over whether the payments they made or received are tax 
  
 87 Laura Bigler, A Change Is Needed: The Taxation of Alimony and Child Support, 48 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 361, 363–65 (2000). 
 88 See Geier, supra note 14, at 431; Roland L. Hjorth, Divorce, Taxes, and the 1984 Tax Reform 
Act: An Inadequate Response to an Old Problem, 61 WASH. L. REV. 151, 155–56 (1986); C. Garrison 
Lepow, Tax Policy for Lovers and Cynics: How Divorce Settlement Became the Last Tax Shelter in Amer-
ica, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 32, 34–35 (1986); Shaller, supra note 86, at 321–22. Adopting the unit view 
may be correct, as taxing alimony is, in large part, a compliance concern. See Davis, supra note 13, at 
185–86. 
 89 See, e.g., the ownership attribution rules of 26 U.S.C. § 318 (2012). While they create a maze of 
relationships to track, they do so to support the section 302 redemption test, which requires knowing a 
shareholder’s actual and constructive ownership interests in the corporation. 
 90 See infra Parts I.B.2.b & III.  
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alimony.91 Most commonly, courts must determine whether the payments 
made pursuant to the agreement terminate at death.92 Courts may find that 
state law operates to end payments at the death of the recipient, even if the 
divorce agreement does not so provide.93 Or the courts may have to address 
cases in which the divorced spouses take inconsistent positions, creating a 
potential whipsaw situation for the federal government.94 Whatever the 
source of the confusion, the simple fact that individuals continue to be forced 
into court to determine the nature of their divorce-related payments more than 
thirty years after “simplifying” reform suggests those old goals may not yet 
be met.95  
Importantly, the time spent litigating the tax classification of a payment 
does little to reveal the true substance of the payment. Guided by the 1984 
reforms, courts have turned away from efforts to properly characterize a pay-
ment, stating that the reforms were meant to “eliminate the subjective inquir-
ies into intent and the nature of payments that had plagued the courts.”96 In-
deed, Congress clearly expressed its choice for simplicity over substance by 
allowing taxpayers to elect out of section 71 by its own terms.97 Though sub-
section (f) re-characterizes some ostensible alimony payments as property 
settlements, it does so in a mechanistic fashion—assuming payments that de-
crease too quickly are, in fact, property settlements rather than true alimony 
  
 91 A survey of the family law practice literature makes clear the consensus that technical expertise 
is required to ensure individuals do not end up with negative or unexpected tax consequences after divorce. 
See, e.g., Daniel J. Jaffe & Lorna A. Riff, The Tax Traps of Alimony, 25 FAM. ADVOC. 24, 29 (2003) 
(advancing the principle that individuals, even those who seek counsel, still fail to comply or realize the 
tax consequences they intended) (“Too many preventable mistakes are still being made with unforeseen 
consequences.”); Stephen P. Comeau, An Overview of the Federal Income Tax Provisions Related to Al-
imony Payments, 38 FAM. L.Q. 111, 125–26 (2004) (“Settlement or adjudication of any divorce or legal 
separation proceeding should be undertaken only after a thorough analysis of the tax consequences of the 
various inter-spousal payment scenarios.”); Melanie James, Tax Ramifications of Separation and Divorce, 
PRACTICAL TAX STRATEGIES, July 2016, at 4 (“The correct wording of a separation or divorce agreement 
is crucial.”).  
 92 See, e.g., Muniz v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (RIA) 2015–125 (2015) (holding that “[l]ump-sum alimony” 
is not tax alimony because Florida law would require satisfaction of the amount owed even after the death 
of the recipient). 
 93 See, e.g., Leslie v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (RIA) 2016–171 (2016) (“The requirement that any liability 
to make payments terminates upon the death of the payee spouse is central in distinguishing between 
alimony and property settlements. . . . Its presence here by operation of state law means the contingent 
Enron payments were alimony taxable to Leslie.”). 
 94 See, e.g., Kean v. Comm’r., 407 F.3d 186, 189 (2005). The potential for whipsaw—spouses tak-
ing inconsistent positions over the tax treatment of a given item—drove response to the U.S. v. Davis case 
and enactment of 26 U.S.C. § 1041 (2012). See Katherine D. Podris & Gary J. Podris, Section 1041 Was 
the Cure for U.S. v. Davis: Now How to Fix the Cure, TAXES, Aug. 1990, at 581. 
 95 Cf. Lynne C. Halem, Change Is Coming: Tax Reform Act Punishes Divorcing Couples, 
MEDIATE.COM (Mar. 2018), https://www.mediate.com/articles/halemlalimony.cfm. 
 96 Hoover v. Comm’r, 102 F.3d 842, 845 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 97 26 U.S.C. § 71 (2012). 
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payments.98 Alternatively, a payment may have all the facial trappings of al-
imony—paid in cash for support of the spouse and incident to a divorce—
but by stating simply that the payments are nondeductible/excludable, the 
couple chooses its own tax classification.99 This private ordering option could 
be justified on other grounds, but it weakens any argument that current tax 
law improved the accuracy of tax classifications for payments incident to di-
vorce. 
b. Costly Noncompliance 
Noncompliance, whether deliberate or inadvertent, comes at significant 
cost. In May 2014, the Wall Street Journal reported that the Service would 
“devot[e] more scrutiny to taxpayers’ claims about alimony.”100 The in-
creased scrutiny came on the heels of a March 2014 report by the TIGTA.101 
In that report, the TIGTA analyzed all 567,887 returns for taxable year 2010 
that had alimony deductions.102 It found that 47 percent of those returns 
claimed a deduction “for which income was not reported on a corresponding 
recipient’s tax return, or in which the amount of alimony income reported did 
not agree with amount of the deduction taken.”103 In total, those returns 
claimed $2.3 billion in alimony deductions.104  
The TIGTA reported that the discrepancies suggest there may be a sig-
nificant alimony tax gap caused by noncompliance with the tax alimony re-
gime.105 Importantly, the discrepancies cannot be largely attributed to recipi-
ents whose income did not give rise to a filing requirement.106 Ninety-eight 
percent of the stated recipients of the payments claimed as deductions filed 
or would have been required to file an income tax return.107 Estimating the 
foregone revenue of such discrepancies is challenging because the discrep-
ancies may be due to different causes—one taxpayer may have overstated 
her deduction, whereas another taxpayer may have failed to include her 
  
 98 Id. The result of section 71 requires excess alimony to be treated as a property settlement: ex-
cluded by the recipient and nondeductible to the payor. 26 U.S.C. §§ 71(f), 1041 (2012). See also Craig 
D. Bell, Need-to-Know Divorce Tax Law for Legal Assistance Officers, 177 MIL. L. REV. 213, 214 
(2003) (stating that excess alimony rules try to prevent individuals from disguising property settlements 
as alimony). 
 99 26 U.S.C. § 71 (2012). 
 100 Laura Saunders, The IRS Cracks Down on Alimony, WALL ST. J. (May 23, 2014), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-irs-cracks-down-on-alimony-1400880352. 
 101 See generally TREASURY INSPECTOR supra note 8. 
 102 Id. at 1.  
 103 Id. at 4. 
 104 Id. 
 105 26 U.S.C. §§ 71, 215 (2012). See supra Part I for a full discussion. 
 106 TREASURY INSPECTOR supra note 8 at 4. See 18 U.S.C. § 6012 (2012) for details on who is re-
quired to make a return and IRS PUBLICATION 501, EXEMPTIONS, STANDARD DEDUCTION, AND FILING 
INFORMATION (2018) for inflation adjusted amounts.  
 107 TREASURY INSPECTOR, supra note 8, at 4 
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alimony received.108 The TIGTA estimates, however, that more than $350 
million in tax revenue may have been lost to the taxable year 2010 tax com-
pliance gap.109 While $350 million is a small portion of the nearly $300 bil-
lion tax gap,110 and an even smaller portion of the approximately $1.6 trillion 
in anticipated total revenues from the individual income tax, it is not insig-
nificant.111 Further, such revenue loss estimates do not account for the costs 
to the legal system of continuing to litigate whether payments are alimony 
under section 71. Though a specific figure is not known, it is clear that the 
current regime gives rise to significant monetary costs. 
c. An Undercurrent of Inequity 
A systemic weakness of the current regime is the inequity that flows 
from both the substance of the regime itself and its demonstrated challenges. 
By permitting individuals to shift income from a higher to lower bracket tax-
payer, the tax alimony regime accepts some degree of revenue loss.112 But the 
potential horizontal inequity of the permitted income shifting is exacerbated 
by the fact that the benefit of the arbitrage inures to higher bracket taxpayers 
who are wealthy enough to be well-represented in divorce. When legal fees 
can quickly enter five figures113 and the need for skilled practitioners is high, 
the benefits of the “free money” found in section 71 are likely unevenly dis-
tributed.114 Further, revenue loss estimates do not account for the soft impacts 
of a code that is seemingly capricious, burdensome, or inconsistently en-
forced.115 To the extent the tax alimony regime is perceived as such, it may 
  
 108 Because individuals tax consequences will vary based on their unique circumstances, no one rate 
would have applied to the alimony wrongfully deducted or excluded. For example, the revenue impact of 
an overstated alimony deduction of $5,000 to a 39.6% bracket is greater than the same amount overstated 
by a 25% bracket taxpayer. 
 109 TREASURY INSPECTOR, supra note 8, at 8, App. IV (detailing how the foregone revenue amount 
was calculated).  
 110 The tax gap is the difference between the amount of tax owed and the amount of tax the IRS 
actually collected over a given period. See IRS Releases New Tax Gap Estimates; Compliance Rates Re-
main Statistically Unchanged from Previous Study, IRS.GOV (Jan. 6, 2012), https://www.irs.gov/uac/irs-
releases-new-tax-gap-estimates-compliance-rates-remain-statistically-unchanged-from-previous-study. 
 111 Revenue Projections for FY 2018, CBO.GOV (2018), https://www.cbo.gov/topics/taxes (last vis-
ited July 21, 2018). 
 112 See infra Part III.A.2.a.i for a specific example. See also Geier, supra note 14, at 431–32 (dis-
cussing arbitrage). 
 113 Al Baker, Confronting the High Cost of Divorce, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 10, 2000), http://www.ny-
times.com/2000/09/10/nyregion/confronting-the-high-cost-of-divorce.html. 
 114 Christopher C. Melcher, Simple Answers to Complex Alimony Questions, 27 J. AM. ACAD. 
MATRIM. LAW. 61, 62 (2014–15) (“The payor of alimony may take a deduction for those payments, and 
the payee is required to report the payments as income. From this simple concept flows an opportunity to 
create ‘free money’ between the parties. When the payor is in a higher tax bracket than the payee, the IRS 
ends up subsidizing part of the alimony payment.”). 
 115 TREASURY INSPECTOR, supra note 8, at 5–6. 
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engender further noncompliance through a decrease in faith in the fundamen-
tal fairness of the Code.116 Whatever the total revenue, efficiency,117 and eq-
uity costs may be, the sum of those costs seems significant. 
As this Part makes clear, the taxation of alimony is in need of change. 
The scholarly consensus is that the current regime requires reform, with fre-
quent and costly noncompliance, losses to the fisc, persistent litigation, eq-
uity concerns, and a largely arbitrary distinction between tax and family law 
alimony. The combination of these factors creates a strong case for change. 
But a new approach is needed to address the weaknesses of the current re-
gime, and reconciling the tax and family law concepts of alimony provides 
that approach. Before tax can incorporate the lessons of family law, it is nec-
essary to have a grounding in the family law doctrine, theory, and practice of 
alimony awards. 
II. ALIMONY IN FAMILY LAW: COMPLEXITY AND CONSISTENCY 
Using family law as a guide for reforming the current tax treatment of 
alimony may seem frustrating because its scholars are divided on what ali-
mony is and why it exists. But understanding what alimony is assists in craft-
ing a better tax alimony regime. Importantly, family law theories of alimony, 
while very diverse, have instructive threads of continuity.  
The diversity of thought on alimony is both unsurprising and instruc-
tive—unsurprising, because a concept of alimony depends on how we, as a 
society, understand marriage. How any society understands marriage is nei-
ther constant nor uniform.118 Alimony is thus built on an ever-shifting 
  
 116 Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1453, 1468–70 (2003) (“With respect to tax compliance, empirical evidence supports the role of 
other factors, particularly the influence that other members of society have. For example, a study of the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986 found that ‘those who encountered others who expressed positive attitudes to-
ward the Tax Reform Act displayed greater commitment to complying with it themselves, whereas those 
who encountered others who expressed negative attitudes displayed less commitment.’ Similarly, ‘[o]ne 
of the most consistent findings in survey research about taxpayer attitudes and behaviors is that those who 
report compliance believe that their friends (and taxpayers in general) comply, whereas those who report 
cheating believe that others cheat.’ Of course, that insight does not reveal whether taxpayers who report 
that they do not cheat do so because they believe others do not cheat, or the reverse, and even whether 
taxpayers who state that they do or do not cheat are honest in those assertions. However, there are psy-
chological explanations for why the perception that others do not comply would lessen one’s own incli-
nation to comply. For example, observing others’ noncompliance might change the observer’s moral 
standard so that he or she might feel less guilt in failing to comply.”). 
 117 Though there could be an efficient level of noncompliance, the analysis herein does not attempt 
to determine that level and is focused more on equity and administrability concerns.  
 118 There is an extensive literature on marriage, scholarly and otherwise. See, e.g., STEPHANIE 
COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY: HOW LOVE CONQUERED MARRIAGE (2005); MAURICE GODELIER, THE 
METAMORPHOSES OF KINSHIP (Nora Scott trans., 2011); Sally Brown Richardson, Privacy and Commu-
nity Property, 95 N.C. L. REV. 729, 737–44 (2017) (discussing marriage in the context of privacy and 
community property states); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, From Contract to Status: Collaboration 
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foundation. The fact that family law doctrine cannot settle on one concept or 
theory is instructive, because it is the very area of law that constructs ali-
mony. In light of that fact, tax law should question the wisdom of creating its 
own, rigid definition of a fluid concept. 
Despite not settling on one view of alimony, family law doctrine and 
theory on alimony yield important insights. First, many theories of alimony 
base the right to alimony on investments in and of human capital.119 Second, 
both scholarship and doctrine suggest that the line between payments to sat-
isfy property settlements and alimony payments is hard to define. These two 
insights can guide tax law’s interpretation of alimony and its proper tax con-
sequences. 
A. The Many Forms of Alimony 
State law varies on specifics, but four general types of alimony120 con-
sistently emerge in a survey of law and practice: permanent or indefinite pe-
riodic alimony; rehabilitative alimony; restitutionary or reimbursement ali-
mony; and lump sum alimony.121 While the rationale for each varies, a work-
ing understanding of the nature of and justification for each type lays the 
foundation for the reform proposals detailed in Part III. 
  
and the Evolution of Novel Family Relationships, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 293, 301–13 (2015); see also 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 
(2003). 
 119 Human capital, as a concept, is not without controversy. Alimony theorists rely on the conven-
tional economic definition; however, that defines human capital as the sum of an individual’s talents, 
capacities, and knowledge. See, e.g., Amanda E. Matzek et al., Spousal Capital as a Resource for Couples 
Starting a Business, 59 FAM. REL. 60, 60 (2010); Brian Keeley, Human Capital: How What You Know 
Shapes Your Life, OECD INSIGHTS, at 29 (2007) (“But that gradually changed, and since the early 1960s, 
there’s been increasing agreement on one key part of the growth puzzle, namely, the importance of people 
– their abilities, their knowledge, and their competences – to economic growth. Or, in other words, human 
capital.”); GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY ch. 2 (1993) (discussing specialized investments 
in market and nonmarket capital within the family). A close look at human capital discussions in the tax 
literature suggests that a more nuanced concept of human capital in tax may need to be embraced. Pierre 
Bourdieu, for example, discusses a range of forms of capital, such as social, economic, and cultural capital. 
The social science literature explores the impact of these different forms in fascinating ways. Pierre Bour-
dieu, The Forms of Capital, in READINGS IN ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 280–91 (Nicole Woolsey Biggart 
ed., 2002). Developing a different concept of capital in tax is a project for another time. 
 120 Some states no longer use the term alimony but favor maintenance or support. See, e.g., Lucia B. 
Whisenand, From Father Knows Best to New Rights for Women and Children, 73 N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J. 
49, 50 (2001) (“Alimony no longer exists. Maintenance is available in some cases, but is usually ‘reha-
bilitative,’ with the expectation that the spouse seeking maintenance will upgrade job skills and assist in 
becoming economically self-sufficient. Of course, maintenance is now gender neutral. It may be awarded 
to either the husband or the wife as the facts of the case dictate.”). 
 121 Deborah H. Bell, Family Law at the Turn of the Century, 71 MISS. L.J. 781, 799–806 (2002). The 
labels may vary slightly from state to state, but this Article’s description of changes in Mississippi law 
provides a helpful description of the four types of alimony and trends in awards. 
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Permanent or indefinite periodic alimony is likely the type of alimony 
that most people envision when they hear the term.122 This type of alimony, 
which encompasses long-term payments, strongly aligns with the view of the 
Court in Gould: that alimony is the necessary provision of support from a 
husband to a wife who cannot support herself.123 Under current law, this form 
of alimony is less commonly awarded.124 
Rehabilitative alimony arose with the shift toward no-fault divorce.125 A 
primary goal of rehabilitative alimony is to provide a spouse with support 
until he or she becomes self-supporting.126 This type of alimony is paid for a 
  
 122 Willard H. DaSilva & Steven J. Eisman, Gray Divorce and Remarriage, 83 N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J. 
July–Aug. 2011, at 26, 27–28 (“Generally, long-term marriages go hand in hand with long-term sup-
port.”); Joanne Hughes Burkett, Myths About Marriage & Divorce in South Carolina, S.C. LAW., Sep. 
2005, at 14, 17 (“[Myth:] Nobody pays alimony anymore. Actually, the award of alimony has been both 
extended and narrowed as American society has changed. Historically the justification for alimony, based 
on a duty to support one’s spouse, was to punish the husband’s marital misconduct and to protect the 
wife’s standard of living. But, as American families changed, especially in the late 20th century, women 
achieved more income parity within the marriage and were less likely to receive alimony upon divorce. . 
. . Under § 20-3-130(B), either permanently or temporarily, courts may award different types of spousal 
support. Periodic alimony is usually monthly or bi-monthly payments in cash. Lump sum alimony is a 
single amount sometimes paid in installments. Rehabilitative alimony is paid for a period to assist the 
supported person in achieving self-sufficiency. Reimbursement alimony compensates for contributions to 
the marriage that increased the spouse’s earning potential. Separate support and maintenance may be or-
dered, if requested, when the parties are living apart, regardless of whether a divorce is pending. Finally, 
the court may award any other support for which it finds justification under the circumstances and may 
also grant more than one type of alimony. South Carolina courts prefer permanent periodic alimony. 
When awarding another type of alimony, the court must find special circumstances and specify the type 
awarded in its order. Alimony generally terminates upon death of either spouse or remarriage of the sup-
ported spouse. Importantly, adultery affects one's ability to receive alimony. South Carolina law bars ali-
mony to anyone who commits adultery before signing a property or marital settlement. Under Nemeth v. 
Nemeth, this bar is not removed when both parties commit adultery.” (emphasis added) (citations omit-
ted)). 
 123 Mary Kay Kisthardt, Re-thinking Alimony: The AAML’s Considerations for Calculating Alimony, 
Spousal Support or Maintenance, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 61, 66 (2008) (“The initial rationale 
appeared [to] be premised on the fact that women . . . were without the means to support themselves.”). 
 124 DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 523 (2006) (“An award of perma-
nent alimony is the exception, not the rule.”); see also David H. Kelsey & Patrick P. Fry, The Relationship 
Between Permanent and Rehabilitative Alimony, 4 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 1, 1 (1988) (noting as 
early as the early 1970s the shift away from permanent alimony); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. 
Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1310 (1998) (“Contemporary law discour-
ages long-term alimony, on the grounds that neither spouse has a lifelong duty to support the other after 
divorce.”). 
 125 See Joan M. Krauskopf, Rehabilitative Alimony: Uses and Abuses of Limited Duration Alimony, 
21 FAM. L.Q. 573, 573 (1988) (describing and critiquing the rise of rehabilitative alimony alongside no-
fault divorce). 
 126 Texas, for example, limits the availability of alimony and expressly states the rehabilitative aim. 
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 8.054(a) (West 2017) (“[A] court . . . (2) shall limit the duration of a maintenance 
order to the shortest reasonable period that allows the spouse seeking maintenance to earn sufficient in-
come to provide for the spouse’s minimum reasonable needs, unless the ability of the spouse to provide 
for the spouse’s minimum reasonable needs is substantially or totally diminished because of: (A) physical 
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more limited, defined period than permanent or indefinite periodic ali-
mony.127 
Restitutionary or reimbursement alimony encompasses payments made 
with the express intent to compensate a spouse for particular contributions 
made during the marriage.128 This class of alimony is not provided for in all 
states but, importantly, may be encompassed in considerations for the divi-
sion of property.129 For example, in New York, courts consider whether one 
spouse contributed to the other’s pursuit of an educational degree when eval-
uating settlements.130 The fact that alimony and property division determina-
tions consider contributions to degree attainment relevant131 is a fact that hints 
at the thin dividing line between the two concepts. 
  
or mental disability of the spouse seeking maintenance; (B) duties as the custodian of an infant or young 
child of the marriage; or (C) another compelling impediment to earning sufficient income to provide for 
the spouse’s minimum reasonable needs.”). 
 127 ABRAMS, supra note 124, at 522; see also John C. Williams, Annotation, Propriety in Divorce 
Proceedings of Awarding Rehabilitative Alimony, 97 A.L.R.3d 740, § 2[a] (1980) (“Rehabilitative ali-
mony has been defined as alimony payable for a short, but specific and terminable period of time, which 
will cease when the recipient is, in the exercise of reasonable efforts, in a position of self-support.”). 
 128 See, e.g., Sanford v. Sanford, 694 N.W.2d 283, 290 (S.D. 2005) (“A third type of alimony is 
restitutional or reimbursement alimony, which ‘has as its purpose to reimburse one spouse’s contribution 
during the marriage to advance training or education of the other spouse.’”) (quoting Saxvik v. Saxvik, 
544 N.W.2d 177, 180 (S.D. 1996)). 
 129 ABRAMS, supra note 124, at 522–23; see also, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23(b) (West 2017) 
(“(9) The history of the financial or non-financial contributions to the marriage or civil union by each 
party including contributions to the care and education of the children and interruption of personal careers 
or educational opportunities.”). 
 130 E.g., O’Brien v. O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 716 (N.Y. 1985) (“The determination that a profes-
sional license is marital property is also consistent with the conceptual base upon which the statute rests. 
As this case demonstrates, few undertakings during a marriage better qualify as the type of joint effort 
that the statute’s economic partnership theory is intended to address than contributions toward one 
spouse’s acquisition of a professional license. Working spouses are often required to contribute substantial 
income as wage earners, sacrifice their own educational or career goals and opportunities for child rearing, 
perform the bulk of household duties and responsibilities and forego the acquisition of marital assets that 
could have been accumulated if the professional spouse had been employed rather than occupied with the 
study and training necessary to acquire a professional license. In this case, nearly all of the parties’ nine-
year marriage was devoted to the acquisition of plaintiff’s medical license and defendant played a major 
role in that project. She worked continuously during the marriage and contributed all of her earnings to 
their joint effort, she sacrificed her own educational and career opportunities, and she traveled with plain-
tiff to Mexico for three and one-half years while he attended medical school there. The Legislature has 
decided, by its explicit reference in the statute to the contributions of one spouse to the other’s profession 
or career that these contributions represent investments in the economic partnership of the marriage and 
that the product of the parties’ joint efforts, the professional license, should be considered marital prop-
erty.” (citation omitted)).  
 131 See, e.g., Haugan v. Haugan, 343 N.W.2d 796, 796–98 (Wis. 1984); Lundberg v. Lundberg, 318 
N.W.2d 918, 919–24 (Wis. 1982). Both cases discuss Wisconsin alimony law and whether it permits 
compensating a spouse for an investment in another spouse’s degree. The cases consider the fairness of 
the maintenance and property division alongside one another, signaling that either may be used to balance 
an insufficient award of the other. The opinions mix reimbursement and loss theory, alimony theories 
addressed in Part II.B. 
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Lastly, lump sum alimony is a non-modifiable transfer made in limited 
circumstances.132 Some states, such as Alabama, view lump sum alimony as 
a mixed payment of support and property settlement. Considering the nature 
of lump sum alimony (therein “alimony in gross”), the Supreme Court of 
Alabama wrote:  
But, on principle, there is no escape from the conclusion that a decree for alimony in gross, if 
without reservation, becomes a vested right from the date of its rendition and survives the death 
of the husband. Differing from a mere periodic allowance for current and continuous support, 
it is intended to effect a final termination of the property rights and relations of the parties, and 
is an approximate appraisal of the present value of the wife’s future support, and, in a measure, 
a compensation for her loss of inchoate property rights in her husband’s homestead and other 
estate, given to her by statute in case of her survival.”133 
Like reimbursement or restitutionary alimony, lump sum alimony weakens 
the conceptual distinction between alimony as a payment of support and 
property settlements as an allocation of interests in property.134 With a basic 
understanding of the different types of alimony established, examining the 
theories that define a right to alimony is now appropriate.  
B. Variations on a Theme: Alimony Theory 
Alimony began as an expression of the continuing duty of support owed 
to a wife by a husband in divorce.135 English law acknowledged legal divorce 
but not a full severance of the marital relationship.136 While a divorce meant 
that a couple no longer lived together, the husband’s “legal and customary 
duty to support his wife” remained.137 The notion of duty progressively faded 
into one of need.138 Even if a husband had no moral duty to support his former 
  
 132 ABRAMS, supra note 124, at 523 (noting that lump sum alimony is awarded only in circumstances 
in which periodic payments cannot be implemented and/or rehabilitative support cannot be awarded); 24A 
AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 668 (2018) (“Alimony in gross in lieu of a periodic allowance is 
an award of a definite sum of money that becomes vested property from the day of judgment. As a general 
rule, alimony in gross must be paid in full, regardless of future events such as the death of the paying 
spouse or the remarriage of the recipient spouse, and it is not subject to modification.”). 
 133 Smith v. Rogers, 112 So. 190, 192 (Ala. 1927). 
 134 See id. The vesting of the interest and the nonmodifiable nature of lump sum alimony lend it its 
property hue.   
 135 See Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 153 (1917). 
 136 Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (1989); Danielle Morone, A 
Short History of Alimony in England and the United States, 20 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3, 4–5 (2011–
12). 
 137 Ellman, supra note 136, at 5; see also Scott, supra note 124, at 1309 (“Under traditional law, the 
husband’s obligation to pay alimony was a logical extension of the lifelong duty to support his wife.”). 
This view is also found in the rationale for nondeductibility in Gould. 245 U.S. at 153. 
 138 24A AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 672 (2018) (“The factors to consider in awarding 
alimony under a no-fault divorce statute include the ability of one party to pay and the need of the other 
party. The threshold test for determining whether to award alimony requires a court to consider whether 
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wife, the reality of her economic insecurity compelled payment of alimony, 
particularly when it was the husband’s fault that drove the divorce.139 Further, 
contract theory could justify such awards.140 Alimony in a fault-based world 
of divorce “functioned as a sort of damages remedy for breach of the state-
imposed marriage contract.”141 Because the breach of a duty created a needy 
spouse, alimony was the means of meeting that need through privatized sup-
port rather than public dependency.142  
Yet the advent of no-fault divorce undermined the rationale for financial 
support from a husband, even in the face of need.143 What theory justifies one 
spouse continuing to support another after the marriage has ended?144 
  
the party seeking maintenance lacks sufficient property, including property apportioned during the disso-
lution proceeding, to provide for his or her reasonable needs and, if this is so, whether the party’s reason-
able needs can be met through appropriate employment. Other factors usually include the parties’ ages, 
health, education, duration of marriage, and their standard of living during the marriage.”); see also Rieffel 
v. Rieffel, 644 S.E.2d 140, 141–42 (Ga. 2007) (“‘In the absence of any mathematical formula, (fact-find-
ers) are given a wide latitude in fixing the amount of alimony . . . , and to this end they are to use their 
experience as enlightened persons in judging the amount necessary for support under the evidence as 
disclosed by the record and all the facts and circumstances of the case.’ [GA. CODE ANN.] § 19–6–5(a) re-
quires the fact-finder to consider several specific factors[: the standard of living established during the 
marriage; the duration of the marriage; the age and the physical and emotional condition of both parties; 
the financial resources of both parties; where applicable, the time necessary for either party to gain suffi-
cient education or training to find appropriate employment; the contribution of each party to the marriage, 
including services rendered in homemaking and child care; and the financial condition of the parties.]” 
(citation omitted) (quoting Farrish v. Farrish, 615 S.E.2d 510 (Ga. 2005))). 
 139 Ellman, supra note 136, at 5–6 (“When judicial divorce became available in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century, alimony remained a remedy. Courts and legislatures still viewed alimony as proper 
because women remained dependent and society expected husbands to support their wives.”). 
 140 Scott, supra note 124, at 1311–13 (discussing a contractual framework for alimony awards). 
 141 Jana B. Singer, Alimony and Efficiency: The Gendered Costs and Benefits of the Economic Jus-
tification for Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2423, 2424 (1994). Cf. Scott, supra note 124, at 1312–15 (discussing 
how alimony awards are not wholly consistent with contract theory and noting that need continues to play 
an outsized role, despite human capital justifications for the right to alimony). 
 142 Starnes, supra note 16, at 271 (“In extreme cases, the pragmatic justification for alimony is easy 
enough: alimony protects the state from the job of supporting a divorced spouse who, without alimony, 
would be thrust into poverty. Indeed, state statutes typically identify a claimant’s ‘need’ as an alimony 
trigger. But trial courts are given broad discretion to define ‘need’ and state-interest does not explain cases 
in which alimony is awarded to a divorcing spouse who faces a decline in standard of living short of 
poverty. Nor does pragmatism answer the many questions to which alimony demands answers: How 
much? How long? To what end? On what grounds—modification or termination?”). 
 143 Ellman, supra note 136, at 6. 
 144 Need remains a relevant factor in determining alimony. That fact does not undermine the argu-
ment that human capital theories of alimony call into doubt whether alimony is income to the recipient, 
however. The recipient’s need is created, at least in part, by lost human capital or foregone accumulation 
of human capital caused by the recipient spouse’s investment in the marriage. Need is a symptom of an 
unequal shifting of human capital from the recipient to the payor spouse. The proposed reform can resolve 
the inequity by keeping alimony in the tax base of the payor spouse. For the idea that alimony is interested 
in remedying an imbalance between spouses, see June Carbone, Economics, Feminism, and the Reinven-
tion of Alimony: A Reply to Ira Ellman, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1463, 1466 (1990). For commentary on the 
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Scholars have offered many possible rationales that share a common thread: 
investments in and of human capital give rise to a right to alimony. 
Consider the work of influential scholar Professor Ira Ellman. In The 
Theory of Alimony, Professor Ellman offers an economic efficiency argument 
in support of alimony.145 Rejecting contract analogies, Professor Ellman ar-
gues that the availability of alimony encourages efficient specialization of 
labor within a marriage.146 Rather than “a way of relieving need,” alimony is 
“an entitlement earned through marital investment, and . . . a tool to eliminate 
distorting financial incentives.”147 Professor Ellman assumes a specialization 
of labor within marriage in which one spouse focuses on market work and 
one prioritizes domestic work.148 He recognizes, however, that such speciali-
zation puts the lower-earning spouse at risk that, without the prospect of com-
pensation, she could encourage the spouse whose energies would be best de-
voted to “marital investment” to instead remain in market work to protect 
against potential reduced earning capacity.149 Alimony is the payment for “a 
compensable loss in earning capacity” due to the benefits provided to the 
spouse in market work by the spouse who invests a larger part of (or entire) 
effort in domestic work.150 The amount of alimony awarded is keyed to the 
recipient’s diminished earning capacity or, stated differently, her lost or dam-
aged human capital.151 
Accepting Professor Ellman’s economic efficiency argument requires 
accepting his assumption that the state should encourage such specialization, 
which is not uncontroversial.152 But his conceptualization of the behavior that 
gives rise to a right to alimony need not be tied to his prescriptive goal and 
is, indeed, reflected in the alimony factors of many states.  
Professor Jana Singer offers a different rationale for alimony that at-
tempts to encourage and reflect more equal investment in the marital rela-
tionship.153 Professor Singer argues that economic efficiency alimony 
  
search for a theory of alimony, see Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond A New Theory of Alimony, 
82 GEO. L.J. 2227, 2227–29 (1994). 
 145 See Ellman, supra note 136, at 40–73. 
 146 Id. at 48. 
 147 Id. at 52. 
 148 Id. at 48. 
 149 Id. at 50–52. 
 150 Id. at 51. 
 151 Ellman, supra note 136, at 40–53 (“To identify these losses, we compare the claimant’s economic 
situation at the end of the marriage with the situation she would have been in if she had not married. This 
comparison reveals that lost earning capacity is the only continuing financial loss.”). 
 152 Nor is it an assumption with which the author agrees. For a critique of Professor Ellman’s ap-
proach that is consistent with the proposed reform, see Carbone, supra note 144, at 1501 (“Such awards 
will be obligations, not charity, installment payments for benefits retained, not punishment and not anti-
quated remnants of an otherwise severed relationship. Recognition that the obligation arises from the 
intangible benefit, rather than from the more quantifiable sacrifice, also will eliminate any illusion of 
certainty. The inability to achieve precise calculations should not stand in the way of substantial justice.”). 
 153 Singer, supra note 141, at 2453–56 (offering an “alternative vision of marriage [that] would com-
bine the equal partnership ideal that underlies current equitable division schemes with the economist’s 
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theories fail to recognize that lost earning capacity does not account for the 
human capital gains and losses of each spouse.154 Instead of privileging mar-
ket work as the primary source of increasing human capital, Professor Singer 
argues that alimony law should view both spouses, regardless of their com-
parative investments in market or nonmarket work, as “equal contributors to 
the marriage.”155 Alimony payments, in Professor Singer’s view, are a shar-
ing of the payor’s income justified by the recipient’s investment of his or her 
human capital in the marriage.156 The rationale is simple, though not neces-
sarily easy to empirically prove: the higher-earning spouse owes his or her 
higher-value human capital, at least in part, to the marriage.157 As such, the 
lower-earning spouse has some claim to that capital.158 
Professors Ellman and Singer are prominent examples of contemporary 
alimony theorists who find human capital as a foundation for alimony in a 
no-fault divorce world. The concepts they discuss—human capital, need, 
economic efficiency, loss, contractual damages—arise in reform proposals 
and works agreeing with and critiquing their views.159 Though no one theory 
has universal approval, there is great fluidity of the boundaries separating the 
many rationales for alimony, suggesting that the most productive search is 
for unifying themes of the various theories. And underlying similarities do 
emerge. Professor Cynthia Starnes synthesizes the continuities in the alimony 
theory literature into three broad categories: “(1) Gain Theory (emphasizes 
expected returns on marital investments)[;] (2) Loss Theory (emphasizes 
compensation for loss experienced at divorce)[; and] (3) Contribution Theory 
(emphasizes reimbursement for marital contributions).”160 
  
recognition of enhancements in human capital as the most valuable asset produced during most mar-
riages”). 
 154 Id. at 2444. 
 155 Id. at 2454 (“As equal contributors to the marriage, each spouse should be presumptively entitled 
to benefit equally from it in the event of divorce; if divorce produces a net economic loss, each spouse 
should bear an equal portion of that loss. This alternative vision would reject specialization as a goal and 
would instead focus on encouraging both spouses to invest substantially in their marriage. It would do so, 
in part, by reducing the portability of a primary wage-earner’s investment in market-oriented human cap-
ital.”). 
 156 Id. 
 157 See id. at 2444 (“[M]arriage not only depletes a wife’s stock of human capital, it also significantly 
enhances a husband’s.”); Ellman, supra note 136, at 46 (noting that married couples think “shift[ing] 
economic sacrifices from the higher earning spouse to the lower earning spouse . . . increase[s] the income 
of the marital unit as a whole”). 
 158 Singer, supra note 141, at 2454–60. 
 159 See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS (AM. LAW INST. 2002). Cf. Kisthardt, supra note 123, at 78–79 (describing how the 
American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers’ ALI Commission argued against the ALI principles and its 
focus on human capital and how the Commission views factors such as career sacrifice and age, both of 
which are tied to damaged or lost human capital, as relevant to its own proposal). 
 160 Starnes, supra note 16, at 279. For a discussion of Professor Starnes’s work, see Naomi Cahn & 
June Carbone, Whither/Wither Alimony, 93 TEX. L. REV. 925 (2015). 
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Professor Starnes persuasively argues that the various modern theoreti-
cal justifications for alimony distill down to three basic understandings of 
what occurs at divorce.161 Most importantly for tax reform, she frames those 
understandings in terms with which tax is intimately familiar: gain, loss, and 
contributions to and of capital.162  
Gain theorists tend to view spouses as equals and, as did Professor 
Singer,163 view marriage as an inherently productive endeavor achievable 
only because of the combined work of both spouses.164 The language of dif-
ferent gain theorists proposals may differ—one may characterize alimony as 
a repayment of a loan of support, another as a divvying of interests in or 
earnings from human capital—but they share the common view that both 
spouses have a claim to the shared endeavor.165 Summarizing the similarities 
between gain theorists’ views, Starnes writes:  
There is much common ground among gain theorists. Most obvious is their focus on collabo-
ration, teamwork, and partnerships between spouses who join together to produce mutual ben-
efits which they expect to share—income and a home with children. If their marriage ends, 
divorce law must impose an exit price on the spouse who takes the larger share of marital 
returns with him. This price will usually take the form of income sharing, and is gain theorists’ 
rationale for alimony.166 
The distinction in gain theory between marital returns and marital capi-
tal is not always clear, a fact that is addressed in Part III. Most important, 
however, is the fact that gain theorists give equal weight to investments of 
human capital regardless of whether those investments were market or non-
market oriented.167  
  
 161 See Starnes, supra note 16, at 278–79. Cf. Robert Kirkman Collins, The Theory of Marital Resid-
uals: Applying an Income Adjustment Calculus to the Enigma of Alimony, 24 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 23, 
49–54 (proposing a formula-based methodology for determining alimony awards that does not appeal to 
a human capital rationale). Interestingly, however, the author argues against a tax deduction for the payor. 
See id. at 60–61. 
 162 See Starnes, supra note 16, at 278–79. 
 163 Professor Starnes classifies Professor Singer as one of a number of gain theorists. Id. at 281. 
 164 Singer, supra note 141, at 2454; see also Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Theory Versus Reality: The 
Partnership Model of Marriage in Family and Income Tax Law, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1413, 1449 (1996). 
 165 Starnes, supra note 16, at 281–83 (discussing different versions of gain theory). 
 166 Id. at 283 (emphasis added). Professor Starnes uses the term “exit price.” The punitive aspect of 
a penalty could point to a deduction/inclusion regime akin to the treatment of punitive damages under 
section 104 (26 U.S.C.A. § 104 governs, in part, the tax treatment of compensation for account of personal 
injury). This language should not be viewed in isolation, however, but read in the context of gain theory 
as a whole. Specifically, gain theorists argue that alimony is necessary to prevent enrichment of the payor 
spouse and make whole the recipient spouse. Absent alimony, the payor spouse would leave the marriage 
enriched because of the investment of the recipient spouse. Thus, when viewed in context, the exit price 
is really a repayment of invested human capital. 
 167 Id. (“A key feature of gain theory is its general disinterest in relative spousal contributions. Gain 
theorists tend to assume, sometimes as a default rule drawn from visions of contemporary marriage, that 
spouses are equals. Equality is an assigned status that does not depend on the type or size of each spouse’s 
 
380 GEO. MASON L. REV. [VOL. 25:2 
In contrast to gain theorists, loss theorists view alimony payments not 
as a sharing of mutually created gain but instead as compensation for a loss 
suffered.168 Loss of earning capacity—the focus of loss theorists—is the 
symptom of a loss of human capital.169 Gain theory and loss theory are there-
fore “flip sides of the same coin.”170 Because courts and state law frequently 
look to a lost earning capacity rationale to justify both rehabilitative and pe-
riodic or permanent alimony, it is an important rationale.171 
Lastly, contribution theory is a narrower but related approach that sees 
alimony as a payment for benefits conferred by the recipient to the payor 
spouse.172 Contribution theory most closely aligns with rationales for reim-
bursement or restitutionary alimony.173 Under contribution theory, which typ-
ically focuses on the recipient spouse’s investment in the payor spouse’s hu-
man capital, the recipient spouse has a right to recover her investment upon 
divorce.174 
C. Lessons for Tax Law 
Alimony theory yields an important insight for tax law: that the right to 
alimony derives from investments in and of human capital. A second insight 
  
contribution. As equals, spouses are entitled to equal returns on communal, joint investments—no matter 
who brought home the bigger paycheck and no matter who was the better cook.”). 
 168 Id. at 284–85. 
 169 Id.; Ellman, supra note 136, at 49. 
 170 Starnes, supra note 16, at 285. Professor Starnes argues that loss theory is less preferable because 
it relies on describing the alimony recipient as a victim, rather than an “equal stakeholder.” Id. 
 171 See supra Part II.A. 
 172 Starnes, supra note 16, at 286. 
 173 See id. For a representative discussion of the right to reimbursement that may arise from one 
spouse’s contribution to the human capital acquisition of another, see In re Marriage of Watt, 262 Cal. 
Rptr. 783, 789 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (“We agree that section 4801, subdivision (a)(2), should be interpreted 
broadly to require consideration of all of the working spouse’s efforts to assist the student spouse in ac-
quiring an education and enhanced earning capacity. Where the nonstudent helped the student through 
school and into a higher earning career position, that spouse’s contributions should be given weighty 
consideration by the trial court in deciding the propriety and extent of a spousal support award. Nothing 
in the statutory language indicates that one spouse’s contribution to the attainment of the other’s education 
or career is limited to direct education expenses. The notion of ‘contributing to the attainment’ of an 
education is broader than the section 4800.3 concept of ‘payments made for’ education or training. Com-
mon sense tells us that more goes into contributing to the attainment of an education than the mere cost 
of tuition, books and supplies. Many students who seriously pursue education or training forego full-time 
or even part-time remunerative employment, relying instead on other sources to provide for their neces-
sities of life. Certainly, these other sources contribute to the student’s attainment of an education. We thus 
hold that in the case of a career-threshold marriage where the working spouse provided a far greater share 
of living expenses while the student spouse acquired a professional degree, section 4801 requires the trial 
court to consider the totality of the nonstudent’s contributions and efforts toward attainment of that degree, 
including contributions for ordinary living expenses.”). 
 174 E.g., Watt, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 789. Importantly, courts may conceive of the nature of that invest-
ment broadly. Id. 
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follows from the first and is further supported by both doctrine and practice: 
alimony is not clearly distinguishable from settlements of property. That in-
sight is the focus of this Part. Taken together, these insights provide guide-
posts for reforming the tax alimony regime.  
Neither alimony doctrine nor practice supports a strong dividing line 
between alimony and property settlements.175 Both trends in alimony and the 
law that governs the process by which alimony is awarded demonstrate the 
weakness of the supposed boundaries. First, consider alimony law itself. 
Pennsylvania provides a representative example.176 Section 3701 of Title 23 
of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes directs courts to consider the suf-
ficiency of the alimony award alongside the property award.177 If alimony is 
increased because a property award is insufficient, alimony becomes a stand-
in for property rather than a wholly distinct concept.178  
Even when courts accept the idea of a clear line between alimony and 
property settlement, they regularly struggle to distinguish between the two. 
  
 175 Though not expressly focused on tax, Professor Singer calls into question the strength of the 
division between alimony and property settlement. Jana B. Singer, Divorce Obligations and Bankruptcy 
Discharge: Rethinking the Support/Property Distinction, 30 HARV. J. LEGIS. 43, 50 (1993) (finding the 
division weak even in early precedent: “Viewed against this background, a wife’s entitlement to ali-
mony in the event of a divorce represented more than mere judicial enforcement of the husband’s legal 
duty of support. Alimony also functioned as a means of reallocating property interests—a way of restoring 
to a virtuous wife at least some of the access to material wealth that she had lost by virtue of her marriage. 
The Supreme Court in Audubon explicitly recognized this ‘property division’ aspect of alimony when it 
stated—in support of the nondischargeability of alimony obligations—that ‘[p]ermanent alimony is re-
garded rather as a portion of the husband’s estate to which the wife is equitably entitled, than as strictly a 
debt.’” (quoting Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U.S. 575, 578 (1901))).  
 176 23 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3701 (West 2017) lists seventeen factors for determining 
whether alimony is necessary as well as the nature, amount, duration, and manner of payment. Those 
factors include:  
(6) The contribution by one party to the education, training or increased earning power of the other party 
. . .  
(16) Whether the party seeking alimony lacks sufficient property, including, but not limited to, property 
distributed under Chapter 35 (relating to property rights), to provide for the party’s reasonable needs . . . 
.  
 177 Id. 
 178 For an example of a court granting reimbursement alimony, see Bold v. Bold, 574 A.2d 552, 556 
(Pa. 1990) (“With a view to balancing the extremes, we hold, therefore, that separate and apart from the 
equitable distribution of marital property, consistent with fairness, the supporting spouse in a case such as 
this should be awarded equitable reimbursement to the extent that his or her contribution to the education, 
training or increased earning capacity of the other spouse exceeds the bare minimum legally obligated 
support as reflected in the guidelines promulgated by this Court.” (footnotes omitted)). Though the court 
stated that the award was separate from property division, it directed the lower court to reconsider the 
award because of a perceived insufficiency of the property division, undermining its claim that reimburse-
ment alimony was wholly separate from property settlement. Id. (“Because there was insufficient marital 
property to compensate Mrs. Bold for her financial contributions to the marriage in excess of those made 
by Mr. Bold, the master and the trial court awarded Mrs. Bold a cash amount which the master called 
‘reimbursement alimony’ and which the trial court called ‘equitable reimbursement.’”). 
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In the South Carolina case of Miles v. Miles,179 for example, the issue before 
the court was whether health insurance payments made by a husband on be-
half of his ex-wife were modifiable support or non-modifiable property set-
tlement.180 The South Carolina Court of Appeals held that the payments “un-
ambiguously did not create a support obligation.”181 The lower court reasoned 
that because the divorce agreement specifically eschewed alimony, the health 
insurance payments must not be alimony and, therefore, not support.182 Cor-
recting the lower court, the state supreme court stated that the lower court 
“placed too much emphasis on the language that the parties ‘waive[d] ali-
mony,’” noting that “[s]uch semantic distinctions have been abolished in 
family law.”183 The substance of the nature of the transfer, not terms of art, 
would govern. Considering the substance of the insurance payments, the 
court stated that “the maintenance of health insurance has the hallmark of 
spousal support: it provides the receiving spouse a benefit which is normally 
incident to the marital relationship.”184 That such a case still, in 2011, had to 
go to the state supreme court before the line between property settlement and 
alimony could be drawn makes clear that distinguishing the two is no easy 
task. 
Second, the trend in alimony away from permanent, periodic payments 
further blurs the line between property settlement and alimony. Though other 
states have not followed, New York holds that support given toward one 
spouse pursuing an advanced degree makes the degree marital property.185 
Acquired human capital has, then, some characteristics of property. Though 
New York is an outlier on this issue, human capital theories of alimony are 
in line with New York’s rationale.186 Even states that do not characterize a 
degree as marital property consider contributions to such human capital in 
alimony awards, which suggests that though these states stop short of for-
mally classifying acquired human capital as property, they are sensitive to 
the fact that it is a valued asset in which both spouses may invest.187 Further, 
as courts shift toward awarding restitutionary or rehabilitation alimony188 
  
 179 711 S.E.2d 880 (S.C. 2011). 
 180 Id. at 882. 
 181 Id. at 883. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. at 884. 
 184 Id. at 883–84.  
 185 Cf. O’Brien v. O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 715–16 (N.Y. 1985) (“[M]arital property encompasses 
a license to practice medicine to the extent that the license is acquired during marriage.”).  
 186 See discussion infra Part III.A.2.  
 187 See, e.g., discussion of Pennsylvania’s law supra note 176. 
 188 Noting that statistical analysis of alimony is scant, scholars have described the shift from long-
term alimony to rehabilitative alimony. Judith G. McMullen, Alimony: What Social Science and Popular 
Culture Tell Us About Women, Guilt, and Spousal Support After Divorce, 19 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 
41, 47 (2011) (“The case law has evolved in a way that allows spousal maintenance payments to be used 
for rehabilitation or restitution. . . . [P]ermanent alimony [is] becoming more and more exceptional.” 
(footnotes omitted)); Morone, supra note 136, at 7 (“The recent trend towards ‘rehabilitative alimony’—
an award of support for a brief, usually fixed period of time post-divorce—was encouraged in the Uniform 
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rather than permanent or indefinite periodic alimony, alimony practice steers 
alimony away from its long-term support moorings of the early twentieth 
century. This shift moves alimony into property settlement territory, making 
it, as Professor Jana Singer observed, less about support and more about re-
covery of investment—a classic function of property division.189  
The lessons of family law for tax are compelling. That the doctrine of, 
judicial approach to, and trends in alimony awards undermine a clear divid-
ing line between alimony and property law should shake tax law’s confidence 
in the wisdom of maintaining a clear line with differing tax consequences for 
alimony and property settlement. Similarly, the very theoretical foundations 
of alimony call into question whether tax law should view alimony as income 
to the recipient, casting it instead as return of or compensation for human 
capital. The following Part details the import of key insights from family law 
to tax law.  
III. TOWARD MORE ACCURATE, ADMINISTRABLE, AND EQUITABLE 
TAXATION OF ALIMONY 
Tax law could ignore insights from family law and cling to the current 
tax alimony regime. After all, it replaced an unwieldy subjective test with a 
more objective rule, and federal tax law is not bound by state law.190 To main-
tain the status quo would, however, be error, as the weaknesses of the current 
regime make clear. Tax law should instead adopt a new approach to the tax-
ation of alimony that is more substantively accurate, easier to administer, 
and, ultimately, more equitable. This Part details the Article’s proposed 
change in law and sets out its justifications. 
  
Marriage and Divorce Act. By formally rejecting fault-based divorce models and economic dependency 
as grounds for alimony, the UMDA proposed a ‘clean break’ for the termination of the marital union.”); 
Constance L. Shehan et al., Alimony: An Anomaly in Family Social Science, 51 FAM. REL. 308, 310 (2002) 
(“Although it has not been empirically documented, rehabilitative alimony seems to be emerging as the 
predominant judgment.”); Singer, supra note 141, at 2425 (noting the same trend); Starnes, supra note 
16, at 272 (suggesting that the economy makes property settlements a rarity and that alimony takes its 
place) (“In these difficult economic times, with home equity disappearing and retirement savings dimin-
ishing, divorcing couples increasingly have few, if any, significant assets, which renders property distri-
bution a useless tool, and makes income sharing, i.e., alimony, the only available economic remedy for 
the primary family caretaker.”). 
 189 Singer, supra note 175, at 45 (noting that a shift toward reimbursement alimony moves alimony 
into property settlement territory) (“These changes in marital property law have been paralleled by a fun-
damental rethinking of the nature and functions of alimony, more commonly referred to today as mainte-
nance or spousal support. This rethinking has deemphasized the role of alimony as a status-based obliga-
tion designed to alleviate future need and has emphasized instead its compensatory and restitution-
ary functions—functions that have traditionally been associated not with alimony, but with the division 
of marital property.” (footnote omitted)). 
 190 For an interesting discussion of the interplay of federal tax law and state law, see Boris I. Bittker, 
The Federal Income Tax and State Law, 32 SW. L.J. 1075, 1075 (1979). 
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The analysis that undergirds the proposed reforms differs in a signifi-
cant way from prior critiques of the taxation of alimony.191 Much of the ex-
isting scholarship takes the position that alimony payments are clearly in-
come to someone but either avoids deciding to whom the payments are in-
come or asserts, without much analysis, that payments are income to the re-
cipient.192 In lieu of addressing the income question, scholars focus on ad-
ministrability, fairness, or compliance concerns.193 Administrability, fairness, 
and compliance are important considerations and, this Article argues, support 
the proposed no-deduction/exclusion regime. But family law doctrine and 
theory can advance the debate by providing a framework for answering the 
income question. Specifically, this Part argues that applying family law’s hu-
man capital theory of alimony at least calls into doubt whether alimony is 
clearly income to the recipient and at best establishes that alimony is not in-
come to the recipient. 
A. Unified Treatment of All Transfers at Divorce 
Congress should repeal the current deduction/inclusion regime of sec-
tions 71 and 215 in favor of taxing all transfers at and incident to divorce 
under a no-deduction/exclusion approach. Doing so would bring the taxation 
of alimony in line with contemporary alimony theories and trends in alimony 
awards. It also would limit opportunities for costly noncompliance, reduce 
litigation on the proper tax classification of items in divorce proceedings, and 
reduce the equity costs of disparate levels of tax planning at divorce.194 
1. Details of the Proposal 
Repeal of sections 71 and 215195 should occur alongside adoption of two 
new Code provisions specifically setting out the tax treatment of payments 
at divorce. Section 1041 encompasses cash payments that are not alimony 
under section 71, but a new exclusion would provide a degree of clarity that 
  
 191 See sources cited supra note 88. 
 192 See supra Part I. 
 193 See, e.g., Hjorth, supra note 88, at 188. Critiquing the 1984 reform, Professor Hjorth writes, 
“What is needed is a relatively simple change to solve what was essentially an administrative and com-
pliance problem.” Id. He then goes on to propose repeal of the alimony recapture rules and requirement 
that payments terminate at the death of the recipient. Id.  
 194 One might challenge the proposed reform on the grounds that alimony is too rare to justify such 
a significant tax change. However, because tax consequences play a significant role in divorce and sepa-
ration agreements, a shift in the taxation of alimony will have ripple effects in divorce practice and plan-
ning. Further, an ineffective, unfair, and inefficient rule should not persist simply because it will not im-
pact broad swaths of citizens. 
 195 26 U.S.C. §§ 71, 215 (2012). Note that sections 61(a)(8) (requiring the inclusion of alimony in 
income) and 62(a)(10) (identifying the section 215 deduction as an above-the-line deduction) would also 
need to be repealed. Id. §§ 61(a)(8), 62(a)(10). 
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may be desirable in light of the significance of the proposed change and tu-
multuous history of the area.196 Accordingly, Congress should draft a new 
provision to add to part III of subchapter B. Such a provision could read as 
follows:  
26 U.S. Code §___ 
a) General rule—Gross income does not include support payments received pursuant to a 
divorce or separation agreement. 
b) Support payments defined—A support payment is any cash payment, whether periodic, 
lump sum, or otherwise, received by (or on behalf of) the taxpayer with regard to the marital 
relationship of the payor and the taxpayer and/or the care of the payor’s child.  
c) “Divorce or separation instrument—The term ‘divorce or separation instrument’ means— 
1) a decree of divorce or separate maintenance or a written instrument incident to such a 
decree, 
2) a written separation agreement, or 
3)  a decree (not described in subparagraph (A)) requiring a spouse to make payments for the 
support or maintenance of the other spouse.”197 
d) Cross reference—for the treatment of in-kind transfers, see § 1041. 
If Congress desires an abundance of clarity, it can also enact a new de-
duction disallowance provision in Part IX of Subchapter B. However, be-
cause deductions are a matter of “legislative grace”198 and permitted only 
when expressly allowed, a new provision is not truly required. Further, sec-
tion 262 should be construed to disallow alimony, as it does child support 
payments, because it expressly disallows deductions for “personal, living, or 
family expenses.”199 
Such a marked change in law requires a transitional rule. Because some, 
though likely not all, individuals structure their divorce agreements in light 
of current law, current law should continue to apply to such individuals. As-
suming, for example, the proposed reform is adopted200 and goes into effect 
  
 196 In the alternative, section 1041 could be modified to specifically include cash transfers within its 
definition of property. However, the marked clarity of a separate exclusion provision is preferable.  
 197 This language is drawn from the current language defining divorce and separation instruments in 
section 71(b)(2). 
 198 New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). 
 199 26 U.S.C. § 262 (2012). 
 200 If Congress were to adopt such a transition rule, an alternate reform plan would be to add language 
to sections 71 and 215 stating that the inclusion applies only to payments made pursuant to a decree or 
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as of January 1, 2019, any agreements completed prior to that date should be 
governed by current law.201  
2. A Human Capital Theory Rationale 
Human capital—investments thereof or therein, or losses thereof—is 
the concept that unifies the many variations of modern alimony theory.202 Tax 
law should take note of this unifying theme and rationalize the taxation of 
alimony accordingly. Taken together, alimony theory—whether gain, loss, 
or contribution—suggests that alimony should be treated as (1) nontaxable 
compensation for lost or damaged human capital or (2) a return of an invest-
ment in human capital. Essential to both treatments is the recognition of what 
this article terms “alimony basis.” Alimony basis is a modified concept of 
conventional tax basis that derives from monetary and human capital invest-
ments in another’s human capital within the limited context of marriage and 
that becomes relevant only upon divorce. Rather than a standalone concept, 
this Article introduces ‘alimony basis’ as tool to highlight how human capital 
theories of alimony call into question to whom alimony should be income. 
To ensure that the analysis that follows is accessible to tax and nontax schol-
ars alike, an introduction to basis is necessary.  
Basis is a foundational concept in tax law. It is one that is simple in 
principal—it is an accounting tool—but that can be hard to manage in prac-
tice. Suppose you purchase an acre of land for $17,000. Some years later, 
you sell that same land for $25,000 cash. In the year of the sale, you must be 
able to determine the amount of taxable income generated by the sale. The 
intuitive (and correct as a matter of law) amount of gain is $8,000. Basis is 
the reason why.  
Determining the amount of gain or loss in a given transaction requires 
knowing how much consideration a person received (“amount realized”) and 
the amount she already invested in the property (“adjusted basis”).203 Ad-
justed basis is, quite simply, your initial cost investment204 in an asset 
  
agreement first executed prior to the cutoff date. A cross reference to the new exclusion provision also 
could be added to section 71.  
 201 Whether a modification after the effective date of the new regime would trigger application of 
that regime would need to be addressed. Factors such as the substance and materiality of the modification 
would be relevant in determining whether the agreement is so significantly changed as to be effectively 
new.  
 202 See supra Part II. 
 203 Section 1001 defines gain and loss: “The gain from the sale or other disposition of property shall 
be the excess of the amount realized therefrom over the adjusted basis provided in section 1011 for deter-
mining gain, and the loss shall be the excess of the adjusted basis provided in such section for determining 
loss over the amount realized.” 26 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2012). 
 204 This amount is, in tax jargon, cost basis as defined by section 1012. Id. § 1012. Other special 
basis rules govern in different circumstances (e.g., section 1014 determines the basis of property received 
from a decedent), but cost basis is the core concept of basis to which adjustments are made. Id. § 1012(a) 
(“The basis of property shall be the cost of such property, except as otherwise provided in this subchapter 
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tweaked to reflect changes such as additional investment or, as in the case of 
depreciation, progressive cost recovery.205 Returning, then, to the example, 
the taxpayer’s basis in property was $17,000; that amount was her cost to 
acquire the acre. Thus, when she received $25,000 in cash for the property, 
her realized gain was $8,000.206 Her initial investment of financial capital is 
recovered at the sale, but she also received something over and above that 
investment. Tax accounts for both by allowing her to recover her initial in-
vestment tax free while taxing her newfound gain.207  
Alimony basis is a heuristic device that works at the intersection of basis 
and human capital. When human capital and basis meet, however, conflict 
ensues. Historically, tax law holds that investments in or of human capital 
neither create basis nor give rise to deductible costs.208 Stated differently, in-
vestments in human capital are ignored for tax purposes.209 Yet family law 
theories of alimony respect investments of, investments in, injury to, or loss 
of human capital as true costs, likening alimony and human capital to prop-
erty.210 Alimony basis bridges the space between these two understandings—
a challenging maneuver, but not one without precedent.  
  
and subchapters C (relating to corporate distributions and adjustments), K (relating to partners and part-
nerships), and P (relating to capital gains and losses).”). 
 205 Section 1011 defines adjusted basis: “The adjusted basis for determining the gain or loss from 
the sale or other disposition of property, whenever acquired, shall be the basis (determined under section 
1012 or other applicable sections of this subchapter[)] . . . adjusted as provided in section 1016.” 26 U.S.C. 
§ 1011(a). 
 206 Per section 1011, the calculation of her gain is as follows: $25,000 amount realized (cash and the 
fair market value of any property received) less the adjusted basis of $17,000 equals $8,000. This simple 
example assumes that the taxpayer engaged in no activities that would increase the basis, such as investing 
in improvements to the property.  
 207 Section 1001(c) requires recognition of realized gains unless another provision changes that de-
fault result.  
 208 Many discussions of tax and human capital arise in one of three areas: taxation of educational 
costs, personal injury awards, and optimal tax theory. To gain a sense of the discussions (which overlap 
in many pieces), see generally J. Martin Burke & Michael K. Friel, Tax Treatment of Employment-Related 
Personal Injury Awards: The Need for Limits, 50 MONT. L. REV. 13 (1989); David S. Davenport, The 
‘Proper’ Taxation of Human Capital, 52 TAX NOTES 1401 (1991); Paul A. David, Reforming the Taxation 
of Human Capital: A Modest Proposal for Promoting Economic Growth, in ECONOMICS FOR AN 
IMPERFECT WORLD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ 439 (Richard Arnott et al. eds., 2003); 
Dodge, supra note 60, at 147; Mary L. Heen, An Alternative Approach to the Taxation of Employment 
Discrimination Recoveries Under Federal Civil Rights Statutes: Income from Human Capital, Realiza-
tion, and Nonrecognition, 72 N.C. L. REV. 549 (1994); Patrick E. Hobbs, The Personal Injury Exclusion: 
Congress Gets Physical but Leaves the Exclusion Emotionally Distressed, 76 NEB. L. REV. 51, 55 (1997); 
Morgan L. Holcomb, Taxing Anxiety, 14 FLA. TAX REV. 77 (2013); Louis Kaplow, Human Capital Under 
an Ideal Income Tax, 80 VA. L. REV. 1477 (1994); Michael Simkovic, The Knowledge Tax, 82 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1981 (2015); Paul B. Stephan III, Federal Income Taxation and Human Capital, 70 VA. L. REV. 
1357, 1389–97 (1984) (discussion of basis and human capital); Lawrence Zelenak, The Reification of 
Metaphor: Income Taxes, Consumption Taxes and Human Capital, 51 TAX L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1995). 
 209 See sources cited supra note 209. See also 226 U.S.C. § 162 (2012) and 6 C.F.R. § 1.162-5 (2017) 
on the issue of when educational costs are recoverable.  
 210 See supra Part II. 
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Consider the example of personal injury damage awards. Section 
104(a)(2) excludes from income qualifying compensatory damage awards.211 
The rationale for section 104 is controversial but is a useful point of entry to 
human capital and taxation.212 However contested the provision may be, it is 
and has historically been fundamentally concerned with the taxation of com-
pensation for lost or damaged human capital.213 As such, it shares a founda-
tion with modern alimony theory.214 
One recent case encapsulates both the concerns of those who advocate 
excluding compensation for lost or damaged human capital and the grounds 
for its criticism: Murphy v. I.R.S.215 In 2006, the D.C. Circuit considered ac-
knowledging the concept of basis in human capital as it considered the 
boundaries of section 104(a)(2).216 The opinion was criticized217 and ulti-
mately vacated, but the court’s discussion of basis and human capital pro-
vides a clear example of the complexity of acknowledging basis, or some-
thing like it, in and of human capital, just as it also articulates why doing so 
seems appropriate in certain circumstances.218 
The facts in Murphy are relatively straightforward. Martina Murphy re-
ceived compensatory damages after alleging that she had been wrongfully 
terminated from her New York Air National Guard position.219 Murphy orig-
inally included the $70,000 worth of damages in her gross income but then 
filed an amended return seeking a refund of the taxes paid on the damages on 
the grounds of one of two alternative arguments: first, that the damages were 
  
 211 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2). 
 212 See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 60 (providing a useful point of entry into the discussion of the ra-
tionales for section 104). 
 213 Id. (“At the core of section 104 is the issue of recoveries for injuries to ‘human capital,’ i.e., 
damages for lost wage-earning capacity, including recoveries for lost past wages. Both historic and pre-
sent-day theories of exclusion (or inclusion) ultimately derive from a conception of human capital. Human 
capital is the key to distinguishing personal from commercial injuries in situations where they might be 
seen to overlap; thus, it holds the key to defining the proper scope of section 104.”). Professor Dodge 
rejects the idea of basis in human capital for the usual reasons such as administrability and valuation 
concerns, but he carves out a space in which personal injury awards that compensate for lost earning 
capacity (i.e., lost human capital) can be excluded if the awards are net of tax. Id. at 150–60. 
 214 A distinction may be made between qualifying recoveries for lost or damaged human capital 
under section 104, which requires a physical origin, and the nonphysical trigger for lost or damaged human 
capital upon divorce. Scholars debate whether section 104 should encompass nonphysical injuries (as held in the past). 
For examples of both sides of the debate, see Burke & Friel, supra note 209, at 13 (providing a history of section 104 and 
arguing against a broad exclusion) and F. Patrick Hubbard, Making People Whole Again: The Constitutionality of Taxing 
Compensatory Tort Damages for Mental Distress, 49 Fla. L. Rev. 725, 727 (1997) (writing in favor of exclusion). 
 215 460 F.3d 79, 85–87 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated, No. 05-5139, 2006 WL 4005276 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 2006), 
opinion after reinstatement of appeal, 493 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 216 Murphy, 460 F.3d 79. 
 217 E.g., Joseph M. Dodge, Murphy and the Sixteenth Amendment in Relation to the Taxation of Non-Excludable 
Personal Injury Awards, 8 Fla. Tax Rev. 369, 370 (2007). 
 218 Murphy, 460 F.3d at 88. 
 219 Id. at 81. 
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excludable as compensation for personal injury under section 104(a)(2),220 or 
second, that the damage award was not income under section 61 and, there-
fore, any application of section 104(a)(2) that led to inclusion would be un-
constitutional.221  
The court held against the taxpayer on her section 104(a)(2) exclusion 
argument.222 Because that aspect of the opinion does not come to bear on the 
concept of alimony, it need not be addressed here. As the court considered 
Ms. Murphy’s second argument—whether the damages even qualified as in-
come223—it ran headlong into the concept of basis in human capital.  
In its discussion of the constitutionality of taxing damage awards, the 
court gave some credence to the idea that human capital may create basis. 
Though Judge Ginsburg did not expressly accept the idea, he favorably cited 
a 1918 attorney general’s opinion on the taxability of accident insurance pro-
ceeds:  
Without affirming that the human body is in a technical sense the “capital” invested in an 
accident policy, in a broad, natural sense the proceeds of the policy do but substitute, so far as 
they go, capital which is the source of future periodical income. They merely take the place of 
capital in human ability which was destroyed by the accident. They are therefore “capital” as 
distinguished from “income” receipts.224 
This concept of income articulated in early precedent was ultimately 
expanded, culminating in the famous Glenshaw Glass definition of “undeni-
able accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayer[] 
ha[s] complete dominion.”225 Critics of Murphy focus on the fact that such 
  
 220 Section 104(a) expressly excludes standalone emotional distress from its concept of qualifying damages:  
For purposes of paragraph (2), emotional distress shall not be treated as a physical injury or physical sickness. The 
preceding sentence shall not apply to an amount of damages not in excess of the amount paid for medical care (described 
in subparagraph (A) or (B) of section 213(d)(1)) attributable to emotional distress.  
26 U.S.C. § 104(a) (2012). 
 221 Murphy, 460 F.3d at 80–81. 
 222 The first argument was, in Judge Ginsburg’s view, easier to resolve. Section 104(a)(2) excludes from gross 
income “the amount of any damages (other than punitive damages) received (whether by suit or agreement and whether 
as lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of personal physical injuries or physical sickness.” 26 U.S.C. § 
104(a)(2). Judge Ginsburg writes: “Murphy no doubt suffered from certain physical manifestations of emotional distress, 
but the record clearly indicates the Board awarded her compensation only ‘for mental pain and anguish’ and ‘for injury 
to professional reputation.’ The Board thus having left no room for doubt about the grounds for her award, we conclude 
Murphy’s damages were not ‘awarded by reason of, or because of, . . . [physical] personal injuries.’ Therefore, § 104(a)(2) 
does not permit Murphy to exclude her award from gross income.” Murphy, 460 F.3d at 84 (citations omitted). 
 223 Murphy, 460 F.3d at 88. 
 224 Id. at 86. 
 225 Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955). The opinion addressed two separate cases, Glen-
shaw Glass Co. v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 860 (1952) and William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 
637 (1953). Taxpayers in both cases argued that potential items of income—fraud and treble damages and solely treble 
damages, respectively—were not income, relying heavily on the 1920 Supreme Court decision in Eisner v. Macomber, 
252 U.S. 189 (1920). In Macomber, the Court maintained a narrower definition of income as “gain derived from capital, 
from labor, or from both combined.” Macomber, 252 U.S. at 207 (quoting Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 183, 
185 (1918)). Seeing the damages as neither, the taxpayers in Glenshaw Glass and Goldman Theatres argued that the 
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early precedent, in addition to utilizing a narrower definition of income, was 
operating with a still-developing concept of basis.226 While it is true that dam-
age awards may compensate an individual for lost human capital, following 
strict doctrine, the damage award is income because basis in human capital 
is zero.227 By favorably citing precedent that relied on now-outdated notions 
of income and return of capital, the Murphy court opened the opinion to swift 
criticism.228  
Ultimately, the court did not decide whether Murphy had basis in her 
own human capital that would offset any taxable gain from the damage 
award. In a footnote, Judge Ginsburg wrote:  
[T]he Government’s quarrel with Murphy’s analogy, based upon Glenshaw Glass, of “human 
capital” to financial or physical capital is not persuasive. To be sure, the analogy is incomplete; 
personal injuries do not entail an adjustment to any basis, nor are human resources, such as 
reputation, depreciable for tax purposes. But nothing in Murphy’s argument implies a need to 
account for the basis in or to depreciate anything. Her point, rather, is that as with compensa-
tion for a harm to one’s financial or physical capital, the payment of compensation for the 
diminution of a personal attribute, such as reputation, is but a restoration of the status quo ante, 
  
damages were not taxable as income. The Court in Glenshaw Glass did not overrule Macomber but expanded on it, 
turning it into a correct but limited decision. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 431 (“In that context—distinguishing gain 
from capital —the definition served a useful purpose. But it was not meant to provide a touchstone to all future gross 
income questions.”).  
 226 Dodge, supra note 217, at 407 (“The circa-1913 notion of ‘capital’ was taken to mean something like ‘starting 
point.’ However, it took a relatively short time for ‘capital’ to be equated with income tax basis.” (footnote omitted)); 
Dodge, supra note 60, at 151 (noting that the fact that something compensates for lost capital does not mean a payment 
is not income, rather “[r]eplacement of capital is now dealt with explicitly by the ‘basis’ mechanism”); Burke & Friel, 
supra note 208, at 15–16 (noting the expansion of the concept of income). The Glenshaw Glass Court noted the replace-
ment of capital theory of early precedent but only to distinguish it from punitive damages, writing:  
The long history of departmental rulings holding personal injury recoveries nontaxable on the theory that they roughly 
correspond to a return of capital cannot support exemption of punitive damages following injury to property. Damages 
for personal injury are by definition compensatory only. Punitive damages, on the other hand, cannot be considered a 
restoration of capital for taxation purposes. 
 
Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 432 n.8 (citations omitted). For further discussion of the import of this footnote, see Dodge, 
supra note 217, at 414–15, and Burke & Friel, supra note 208, at 18–19.  
 227 Dodge, supra note 217, at 418–19 (“The inescapable conclusion is that a receipt of cash is income unless a 
basis offset is available. In order to obtain a basis offset, it is necessary both (1) that the item in question possess a basis 
and (2) that the item be ‘disposed of’ so as to entitle the taxpayer to offset the basis against the cash receipt. There is no 
basis in personal attributes generally, and in the Murphy case there was no ‘disposition’ of any personal attribute.” (foot-
note omitted)); Hobbs, supra note 208, at 64 (“Although the Attorney General’s human capital approach to accident 
recoveries may have had merit in the abstract, the theory was unsupported by existing tax doctrine. It was clearly estab-
lished that a person’s capital was measured by his dollar investment or cost. The cost to the owner of ‘human capital’ is 
zero . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
 228 Criticisms such as those of Professor Dodge are of a strict concept of basis—one that must have broad applica-
bility. Alimony basis is not intended to have such broad applicability but rather to draw attention to a limited scenario in 
which investments of or in human capital may create something like basis to offset what seems like illusory gain.  
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analogous to a “restoration of capital,”; in neither context does the payment result in a “gain” 
or “accession[] to wealth.”229 
Thus, the court wrestled itself as it searched for a rationale to exclude 
Ms. Murphy’s damage award from income. In the same breath, it toed the 
party line—declining to allow basis in human capital—but then de facto per-
mitted it by finding that, despite a lack of basis, Ms. Murphy was simply 
brought back to zero; she had no income from the damage award.230  
The court’s opinion in Murphy surprised the tax world and was widely 
criticized.231 As a matter of doctrine, the criticism was justified. In his new 
opinion on rehearing, however, Judge Ginsburg quelled any concerns that the 
courts were moving toward recognizing basis in human capital.232 He also 
more accurately characterized the role of basis in determining the amount of 
income.233 Holding that section 61 includes damage awards by implication, 
the court did not address the question of basis in human capital, finding the 
entirety of the award taxable.234 
  
 229 Murphy, 460 F.3d at 88 (citations omitted) (first quoting Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 432 n.8; then quoting id. 
at 430–31). 
 230 Id. at 81. 
 231 See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 217, at 390–425. But see Erik M. Jensen, Murphy v. Internal Revenue Service, the 
Meaning of “Income,” and Sky-Is-Falling Tax Commentary, 60 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 751, 753 (2010). 
 232 Murphy v. I.R.S., 493 F.3d 170, 178 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 233 Though he ultimately did not reach the question of calculating gain from the damage award, Judge Ginsburg 
gave more time to clarifying the role basis plays in current law, writing:  
Finally, the Government argues that even if the concept of human capital is built into § 61, Murphy’s award is nonetheless 
taxable because Murphy has no tax basis in her human capital. Under the IRC, a taxpayer’s gain upon the disposition of 
property is the difference between the “amount realized” from the disposition and his basis in the property, 26 U.S.C. § 
1001, defined as “the cost of such property,” adjusted “for expenditures, receipts, losses, or other items, properly charge-
able to [a] capital account.” The Government asserts, “The Code does not allow individuals to claim a basis in their 
human capital”; accordingly, Murphy’s gain is the full value of the award. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 234 In the 2007 opinion, Judge Ginsburg held that by drafting an exclusion from income of certain damage awards 
in section 104, Congress implicitly amended section 61 to include damage awards as gross income. Id. at 179–80 (“As 
noted above, in 1996 the Congress amended § 104(a) to narrow the exclusion to amounts received on account of ‘personal 
physical injuries or physical sickness’ from ‘personal injuries or sickness,’ and explicitly to provide that ‘emotional 
distress shall not be treated as a physical injury or physical sickness,’ thus making clear that an award received on account 
of emotional distress is not excluded from gross income under § 104(a)(2). As this amendment, which narrows the ex-
clusion, would have no effect whatsoever if such damages were not included within the ambit of § 61, and as we must 
presume that ‘[w]hen Congress acts to amend a statute, . . . it intends its amendment to have real and substantial effect,’ 
the 1996 amendment of § 104(a) strongly suggests § 61 should be read to include an award for damages from nonphysical 
harms. Although it is unclear whether § 61 covered such an award before 1996, we need not address that question here; 
even if the provision did not do so prior to 1996, the presumption indicates the Congress implicitly amended § 61 to 
cover such an award when it amended § 104(a).” (citations omitted) (quoting Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995))); 
see also Stephan, supra note 208, at 1388 (“When federal tax authorities first tried to interpret the ancestor of these 
provisions, they relied on an unsophisticated concept of human capital to identify those instances when compensation 
would produce tax liability. In the early years of the federal tax the government had difficulty treating any type of capital 
recovery as income, especially in cases where segregating the portion of gain accrued before adoption of the sixteenth 
amendment was impracticable. Characterization of the human body as a ‘kind of capital,’ albeit based more on analogies 
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The court’s struggle with the idea that damages represent a taxable gain 
is instructive. Even after vacating its original opinion, the court continued to 
resist the idea that damages represent an accession to wealth. In both opin-
ions, the court expressed the sense that Murphy should not be taxed because 
the apparent gain of the damage award merely compensates for lost human 
capital.235 The resilience of the idea that certain damages should not be taxa-
ble merits attention. As the Ninth Circuit noted in 1983, section 104 may be 
understood as congressional recognition that, even if an individual cannot 
technically have basis in her human capital, taxing damages that compensate 
for that loss seems inappropriate.236 Noting that personal injuries have been 
excluded from income since 1918, the court wrote:  
It was thought that there was no gain and therefore no income as income was then defined by 
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court later made it clear that the Eisner definition of income 
was not exclusive and that other realized accessions to wealth may be taxable income. Since 
there is no tax basis in a person’s health and other personal interests, money received as com-
pensation for an injury to those interests might be considered a realized accession to wealth. 
Nevertheless, Congress in its compassion has retained the exclusion (now codified at I.R.C. § 
104(a)(2)).237 
Thus, while neither Congress nor the courts have expressly allowed in-
vestments in or of human capital to create basis, both have engaged with the 
idea when taxpayers suffer losses of or injuries to human capital.238 This de-
sire to recognize something like basis—to find some way to get around the 
outcome required by current doctrine—may speak to the limits of the analogy 
of human capital to more traditional forms of capital.239 If human capital is 
meaningfully distinct from physical capital, there may be room to carve out 
a different, limited concept of something like basis. Alimony basis plays that 
  
to physical goods than on any abstract notion of future income flows, thus led to exclusion of proceeds from the conver-
sion of any part of this asset. When the Revenue Act of 1918 ratified this result by expressly excluding personal injury 
compensation from taxation, the Solicitor of Internal Revenue explained that Congress meant to endorse the analogy of 
the human body to a tangible capital asset.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 235 The earlier opinion makes clear its discomfort with finding taxable income in a damage award. That discomfort 
seems to persist in the new opinion as, on multiple occasions, the court distances the concept of income from accession 
to wealth, writing:  
Principles of statutory interpretation could show § 61(a) includes Murphy’s award in her gross income regardless whether 
it was an ‘accession to wealth,’ as Glenshaw Glass requires. . . . Accordingly, rather than ask whether Murphy’s award 
was an accession to her wealth, we go to the heart of the matter, which is whether her award is properly included within 
the definition of gross income in § 61(a), to wit, “all income from whatever source derived.”  
Murphy, 493 F.3d at 179. 
 236 See Roemer v. Comm’r, 716 F.2d 693, 696 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 237 Id. at 696 n.2 (citing, inter alia, Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920) and Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass 
Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955)). 
 238 See, e.g., Dotson v. United States, 87 F.3d 682, 685 (5th Cir. 1996) (“Congress first enacted the personal injury 
compensation exclusion in 1918 at a time when such payments were considered the return of human capital, and thus not 
constitutionally taxable ‘income’ under the 16th amendment. The concept of a return of human capital lost through injury 
continues to support the exclusion. The recipient of personal injury damages is in effect forced to sell some part of her 
physical or emotional well-being in return for money.” (citations omitted)). 
 239 See generally Zelenak, supra note 208. 
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role in theorizing the tax treatment of alimony. Family law theory suggests 
that alimony is a tool to compensate for or prevent loss of human capital, not 
unlike personal injury awards. Alimony basis provides a means of tracking 
investments in and of human capital—investments that are then recouped via 
alimony payments. The following Part explores the human capital theory jus-
tification for keeping alimony in the base of the payor. 
a. Human Capital, Alimony Basis, and the Tax Treatment of 
the Recipient  
Applying the concept of alimony basis to the tax treatment of the ali-
mony recipient illustrates how alimony theory calls into doubt whether ali-
mony is clearly income to the recipient. If, in turn, alimony is not income to 
the recipient, the foundation of the current regime is on shaky ground. What 
follows are descriptions of three sets of taxpayers whose marriages give rise 
to awards of reimbursement, periodic, and rehabilitative alimony, respec-
tively. Each scenario illustrates slightly different investments of and in hu-
man capital, providing the opportunity to flesh out the concept of alimony 
basis and its relevance to the proposed reform. 
i. Contribution Theory and Reimbursement Alimony—Hans 
and Gagan240 
Gagan and Hans met in college. Both wanted to pursue graduate de-
grees, but Hans had already been admitted to his MBA program when the 
couple decided to marry, so both decided it best to simply delay Gagan’s 
degree (which likely would require a move) until after Hans completed his 
program. Gagan accepted a job as an admissions counselor at a local college 
to support himself and Hans. Three years after the couple married and a year 
after Hans completed his MBA, the couple divorced. A New Jersey court 
awarded Gagan reimbursement alimony to compensate him for the support 
provided to Hans during his degree program.241  
Contribution theory and reimbursement alimony may be the least con-
troversial scenario in which to recognize alimony basis. Contribution theory 
grounds Gagan’s right to alimony in equity; he invested in Hans’s human 
capital acquisition via a combination of financial capital (paying Hans’s tui-
tion and fees and providing for his support) and human capital (delaying the 
enhancement to his own earning capacity). Alimony theory holds that to al-
low Hans to benefit from that investment would enrich Hans and violate 
  
 240 Each of these examples is crafted with facts which suggest that the type of alimony awarded would be appro-
priate based on those facts. Alimony awards are, however, very inconsistent, so the outcome could vary from state to 
state or even within a given state. See McMullen, supra note 188, at 45–47, 49–50. This uncertainty should not cut against 
the proposed reform, however. See discussion supra note 188. 
 241 See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:34-23 (West 2017). 
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notions of fairness.242 By keying the amount of reimbursement alimony to the 
extent of the investment by the recipient in the payor’s human capital, con-
tribution theory casts reimbursement alimony as a simple repayment of cap-
ital.243 There is, in such a case, no real gain. Gagan is instead returned, as best 
as possible, to his status before he supported Hans.  
If the family law theory characterization of reimbursement alimony is 
correct, then tax can respect the substance of such alimony by allowing Ga-
gan something like basis—alimony basis—in Hans’s newly acquired human 
capital. As alimony theory instructs, Gagan’s financial and human capital 
investments represent real costs. As such, Gagan has alimony basis in Hans’s 
new human capital: his MBA degree. Gagan’s basis in Hans’s newly ac-
quired human capital then offsets any potential income when, after divorce, 
Hans repays Gagan the value of his investment. 
To be clear, current tax doctrine does not permit basis in or of human 
capital. Thus, the proposed concept of alimony basis is analogous to, but dis-
tinct from, the basis of current doctrine. However, allowing something like 
basis—alimony basis—to offset gain from alimony payments in this context 
best supports the goal of alimony itself: the making whole of Gagan and 
recognition of enrichment of Hans. Because reimbursement alimony is keyed 
to the amount invested by the recipient spouse, taxing the award leaves Ga-
gan less than whole. Consider the simplest case in which Gagan paid Hans 
$80,000 of tuition and fees and the court awards $80,000 of reimbursement 
alimony. Assuming every dollar is taxable at a 15 percent rate, taxation 
would reduce the award by $12,000, frustrating the goal of reimbursement 
alimony. If instead we see Gagan’s investment as creating $80,000 of ali-
mony basis, he will incur no tax because alimony basis offsets his alimony 
award, and the goal of reimbursement alimony—making Gagan whole—is 
achieved.  
With this comparatively uncomplicated test case in mind, it is appropri-
ate to discuss a potential challenge to and the proper scope of the concept of 
alimony basis. Allowing alimony basis in human capital in all but the 
  
 242 For an early example of the concept, see Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527, 534 (N.J. 1982) (“To provide 
a fair and effective means of compensating a supporting spouse who has suffered a loss or reduction of support, or has 
incurred a lower standard of living, or has been deprived of a better standard of living in the future, the Court now 
introduces the concept of reimbursement alimony into divorce proceedings.”); for another example, see Gnall v. Gnall, 
119 A.3d 891, 902 (N.J. 2015) (“Reimbursement alimony is awarded appropriately to a spouse who has made financial 
sacrifices, resulting in a temporarily reduced standard of living, in order to allow the other spouse to secure an advanced 
degree or professional license to enhance the parties’ future standard of living.”). Gnall provides the interesting statement 
that New Jersey adopted reimbursement alimony to resist a push to recognize degrees as marital property, perhaps in 
recognition of the potential validity of that view. Note that in both cases, the New Jersey law limits the amount to financial 
contributions—a narrower approach than that of alimony theory but one that strengthens the position that the recipient 
experiences no real gain. 
 243 New Jersey state law expressly provides for the possibility of reimbursement alimony when one spouse sup-
ports another’s acquisition of a degree (i.e., acquisition of human capital). See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:34-23 (West 2017) 
(“Reimbursement alimony may be awarded under circumstances in which one party supported the other through an 
advanced education, anticipating participation in the fruits of the earning capacity generated by that education. An award 
of reimbursement alimony shall not be modified for any reason.”). 
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simplest of cases may raise valuation concerns.244 In the example above, Ga-
gan incurred a clear $80,000 cost. If the court instead awards $100,000 of 
reimbursement alimony, then how should the additional $20,000 be treated? 
It is cost that creates basis, not value.245 Where, however, the cost incurred is 
human capital, valuation and cost may be assumed to be the same.246 Alimony 
theory counsels that Gagan’s right to $100,000 derives from his investment 
of a mix of financial and human capital. Herein, then, the excess $20,000 is 
the value of his human capital investment. It should also be his alimony ba-
sis.247  
Tax law need not be defeated by the challenge of valuing human capital 
in the alimony context.248 Instead, tax law should accept the family law de-
termination of the value of the lost or damaged human capital as its cost.249 
The statement is likely anathema to fellow tax scholars.250 However, it also is 
  
 244 Other scholars have considered this challenge. Noting that tax accepts approximations in areas such as depre-
ciation, Professor Paul B. Stephan III writes:  
Mechanical difficulties in calculating the value of changes in human capital, however, should not dissuade acknowledg-
ment that the changes exist. Although similar measurement problems have prevented comprehensive taxation of unreal-
ized changes in the value of physical capital, they have not barred the use of rules that provide some offsets or approxi-
mations. 
Stephan, supra note 208, at 1363. 
 245 For example, a bathroom remodel that costs $5,000 but increases the value of the home by $8,000 still creates 
only $5,000 of basis. 
 246 This was essentially the approach in United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 66 (1962). Section 1041 of the Internal 
Revenue Code overruled the case in response to different policy concerns, making transfers between spouses nonrecog-
nition events. Nevertheless, there are and have been limited situations in which tax accepts basis equal to value. On 
valuation, see, for an example, Dodge, supra note 60, at 153 n.62 and Davenport, supra note 208. 
 247 Valuing human capital is difficult. See, e.g., Davenport, supra note 208 (discussing foregone earnings and their 
role in cost and valuation of human capital: “That figure as to any particular student is, of course, unknowable, since the 
actual future earnings will depend on many variables and contingencies, including economic conditions, the student’s 
motivation and intelligence, fortuitous circumstances, and her own preferences and choices that guide her down a career 
path. One could indulge in statistical averages, but even then the future earnings attributable to education as opposed to 
other factors cannot be readily isolated.”). Human capital is valued by wages but distinct therefrom. See Dodge, supra 
note 60. 
 248 Cf. Dodge, supra note 60, at 153 (challenging the idea that valuation is possible). 
 249 Inconsistency in awards should not undermine the proposed reform. The concern that may arise is that if courts 
regularly undervalue or overvalue lost capital, then the recipient might remain uncompensated or receive taxable gain. 
The prospect of the recipient remaining undercompensated is less troubling for tax purposes. True, she may have an 
unrecoverable loss, but requiring tax law to look over the shoulder of family law would work against an advantage of 
this proposal: that it keep tax law in its area of expertise. The opposite error—overvaluing the lost human capital—is 
more concerning because it raises the specter of the recipient avoiding tax on what is a true gain (not unlike punitive 
damages in section 104(a)(2)). Accepting family law’s valuation of rights to alimony creates this risk, but deferring to 
that valuation is a key part of making the taxation of alimony more administrable. And the concern should not be inflated. 
If the proposed reform is accepted, spouses would have little reason to shift property settlements to alimony as the latter 
would no longer give rise to a deduction. 
 250 See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 217, at 420–21 (“Human capital simply does not possess basis as a matter of law. 
Basis represents a taxpayer’s cost expressed in dollars that have previously been taxable to that taxpayer. The principal 
component of human capital is a person’s body and its attendant capabilities. Other components result from the acquisi-
tion of learning, culture, social skills, and the like. However, none of these items is considered ‘income’ (an accession to 
wealth) upon acquisition. In addition, any costs incurred by third parties (parents, relatives, friends, government) in 
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a necessary simplifying assumption that points to the proper scope of the 
proposed concept of alimony basis.  
Alimony basis is not intended to track conventional tax basis. Rather, it 
is a concept introduced to support the proposed exclusion by illustrating that 
alimony theory recognizes loss, damage, and investment of human capital as 
true, recoverable costs. Just as human capital resembles but is distinct from 
conventional capital, so too is alimony basis distinct from conventional basis. 
The concept of alimony basis does not map cleanly onto conventional basis, 
but it does provide a mechanism for tracking the investment of the recipient 
spouse in the payor spouse’s human capital for the purposes of considering 
whether alimony should be viewed as clearly taxable income. Where the 
presence of alimony basis seems clear, the view that alimony is without a 
doubt taxable income to the recipient becomes harder to accept. In turn, ex-
cluding alimony payments from income gains theoretical footing. With the 
role of alimony basis in mind, the following two examples further flesh out 
how alimony theory points to the proposed reform of tax alimony. 
ii. Loss Theory and Long-Term Periodic Alimony—Carlos and 
Jean 
Carlos and Jean have been married thirty years. Though Carlos trained 
as a linguist, when Jean received a professorship at the University of Mon-
tana School of Law, the couple decided to move to Missoula, knowing it 
meant Carlos would not be able to work in his chosen profession. Shortly 
after moving to Missoula, Jean and Carlos decided to have a child. Carlos 
remained at home with the child until he was five years old, at which point 
he took a part-time position teaching English to native Spanish speakers. 
Some years later, when both Carlos and Jean were sixty-five, the couple de-
cided to separate. A Montana family court awarded Carlos alimony until his 
death or remarriage.251 
Assume the Montana court that awards the alimony places a great deal 
of emphasis on the duration of the marriage and Carlos’s lost earning capac-
ity.252 Stated differently, the court articulates a strong loss theory rationale for 
  
providing a person with human capital do not transfer to the taxpayer, the Supreme Court having held that third-party 
contributions to the capital of a corporation have a zero basis to the corporation. Finally, most costs incurred by the 
taxpayer with her own funds that result in the acquisition of human capital (living costs) are treated as expenses, not 
capital expenditures. About the only item that might create basis (in theory, at least) would be self-paid education that 
qualifies one for a new trade or business. However, it appears that such costs do not create basis as a matter of positive 
law, on the theory that inherently personal costs (that cannot be deducted as expenses) cannot be deducted indirectly 
through capitalization and depreciation or basis offset. In any event, most people incur no human-capital expenditures, 
and none were alleged to have been incurred in Murphy. Note, however, that such a discrete category of cost is capable 
of accurate accounting. In sum, human capital is similar to self-created goodwill in having a zero basis (or close to it) as 
a matter of law.” (footnotes omitted)).  
 251 See Mont. Code Ann. § 40-4-203 (West 2017). 
 252 This is a reasonable assumption based on these facts. The Montana code states, in pertinent part:  
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the alimony paid.253 Unlike Gagan, Carlos did not invest any monetary capi-
tal. He did, however, invest his human capital in the marriage. Loss theorists 
fix the value of that contribution in the decline in Carlos’s earning capacity.254 
Loss alimony theorists understand Carlos’s progressive decline in earning 
capacity over the years of the marriage as a cost,255 an investment in the mar-
riage, and, to some degree, Jean’s human capital.  
To a loss theorist, Carlos’s situation upon divorce may seem very famil-
iar to that of a taxpayer who uses section 104(a)(2) to exclude damages. The 
divorce is simply a different type of triggering event that prompts the com-
pensation for the lost human capital. The two scenarios are similar in that 
both involve compensation for lost human capital. But the alimony context 
may differ in a way that leaves Carlos in an even stronger position than the 
tort victim. In a loss theory view of alimony, lost human capital justifies the 
alimony award not simply because it was lost but rather because it was in-
vested incrementally in the marriage and, often, in the human capital of the 
payor spouse. Thus, a loss theory of alimony strengthens the return of capital 
analogy beyond that in section 104. 
  
(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or legal separation or a proceeding for maintenance following dissolution 
of the marriage by a court that lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse, the court may grant a maintenance 
order for either spouse only if it finds that the spouse seeking maintenance:  
(a) lacks sufficient property to provide for the spouse’s reasonable needs; and  
(b) is unable to be self-supporting through appropriate employment or is the custodian of a child whose condition or 
circumstances make it appropriate that the custodian not be required to seek employment outside the home.  
(2) The maintenance order must be in amounts and for periods of time that the court considers just, without regard to 
marital misconduct, and after considering all relevant facts, including:  
(a) the financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including marital property apportioned to that party, and the 
party’s ability to meet the party’s needs independently, including the extent to which a provision for support of a child 
living with the party includes a sum for that party as custodian;  
(b) the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party seeking maintenance to find appro-
priate employment;  
(c) the standard of living established during the marriage;  
(d) the duration of the marriage;  
(e) the age and the physical and emotional condition of the spouse seeking maintenance; and  
(f) the ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet the spouse’s own needs while meeting those of 
the spouse seeking maintenance.  
Id. 
 253 In practice, no one theory likely controls a court’s rationale. However, to simplify the analysis, this Article 
analyzes each class of alimony theory independently. Duration of the marriage and lost earning capacity are relevant 
factors under Montana law. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Rudolf, 164 P.3d 907, 912 (2007) (“Maintenance is interrelated 
with and supplements a property division. If, after an equitable division of the marital assets, one party lacks sufficient 
property to fulfill his or her reasonable financial needs, maintenance may be appropriate. The duration of the marriage is 
one of the factors to be considered in fixing the duration of maintenance. During the course of a marriage, a spouse, by 
contributing to the marriage over time, may have lost the ability to support himself or herself independently. If the mar-
riage ends, maintenance may be necessary to allow that spouse to acquire and develop skills to support himself or herself 
in the accustomed manner and, perhaps, even to acquire an estate.” (citation omitted)). 
 254 See discussion supra Part II.C.A.2.ii. 
 255 See supra Part II.C.A.2.ii. Such a shift undoubtedly impacts Carlos’s earning capacity. 
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In loss alimony theory, unlike in the section 104 context, human capital 
is lost or damaged due to its investment in something external. Because loss 
theory gives equal weight to market and nonmarket investments and mone-
tary and nonmonetary costs, it respects investments of human capital in the 
marriage or the human capital of another. The marriage itself and the human 
capital of the payor spouse are viewed as separate, discernable assets. Loss 
theory, then, gives alimony a strong, property-like hue. And in tax, property 
can have basis.  
iii. Gain Theory and Rehabilitation Alimony—Susan and Sarah  
Susan and Sarah were married five years before Susan filed for divorce. 
Susan owns a small engineering firm in which Sarah worked as an office 
manager. When Susan opened the firm, Sarah intended to assist her for a 
limited period of time before returning to her CPA studies. Despite that in-
tention, both decided the firm needed more than just a few months of assis-
tance and agreed it was best to delay Sarah’s continuing studies until the firm 
could support a full-time, nonfamily employee. In divorce proceedings, an 
Arizona court awarded Sarah alimony for three years, at which point Sarah 
would have had time to complete her CPA.256  
Gain theory holds that Sarah’s investment of human capital gives her a 
right to alimony because her investment is either: (1) a loan of human capital 
that creates a debtor/creditor relationship; (2) a contribution that gives rise to 
new marital capital; or (3) a contribution that gives the recipient spouse an 
interest in the payor’s human capital.257 Situation three closely tracks the re-
imbursement alimony analysis previously discussed and need not be ad-
dressed again. Situations one and two require further discussion.  
If Sarah’s human capital investment is construed as a loan,258 it should 
create alimony basis in the loan that could offset repayment of the loan prin-
cipal, herein the alimony award itself.259 If instead, Susan and Sarah are seen 
as creating a wholly new form of marital capital, the question of whether 
alimony is a return of invested capital or a return to that capital arises. If, for 
example, marriage is akin to a business entity, where the marital capital 
formed by both parties’ investments gives rise to taxable dividends or 
  
 256 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-319 (2017). 
 257 See supra Part II. 
 258 See Starnes, supra note 16, at 281–82. 
 259 When an individual takes out a loan, the loan proceeds are not viewed as income because they come with an 
equal and offsetting obligation to repay. Interest received and interest paid, however, may be income or may give rise to 
a deduction. 26 U.S.C. §§ 61 & 163 provide a starting point for determining the tax consequences of interest. If an 
alimony award includes something like interest on the “loaned” human capital, that interest should be taxable. However, 
parsing principal and interest in this context may stretch the loan–human capital analogy too far. 
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distributive share-like returns to that capital, both such payments are taxable 
under current law.260  
But even if marriage is akin to a partnership and divorce is a buyout, an 
analogy advanced by some gain theorists, the recipient is still entitled to a 
return of her basis.261 The question then becomes: is rehabilitative alimony a 
distributive share (taxable) or a return of basis?262 Deciding on an answer is 
no easy task when the strength of the partnership analogy, or how rigorously 
nontax scholars meant it to apply, is itself at issue. Strictly applying precedent 
to hold that alimony is clearly a guaranteed payment, because the value is set 
by agreement and will be paid regardless of earnings, or a distributive share, 
because it is keyed to future earnings that would have been shared, may 
stretch the analogy too far.263 
By awarding rehabilitative alimony, the court allows Sarah to recover 
the human capital she invested in Susan and her business with the express 
purpose of allowing her to reinvest in her own human capital.264 The simplest 
approach would be to assume that Sarah’s recovery is first and only a return 
of her human capital investment in the marital capital or Susan’s increased 
human capital.265 Doing so is consistent with the gain theory view of alimony, 
which sees alimony as ensuring that the payor spouse does not leave the mar-
riage with marital capital exceeding her investment.266 The return of that in-
vestment should be cost-free to Sarah because her investment should be un-
derstood to create alimony basis. Characterizing the transaction this way—
  
 260 See Kornhauser, supra note 164, at 1440 (for a tax-specific discussion of analogizing marriage to a business 
entity). 
 261 For an opposing view, see id. Professor Kornhauser challenges the utility of the partnership model of marriage. 
(“Are they like section 736(b) payments in exchange for a partnership interest and therefore non-taxable under section 
1041? Or are they like section 736(a) payments, creating taxable income under section 71? These payments for human 
capital appear to be more akin to sections 736(a) and 71 alimony payments because they relate to the pretax expected 
return of future earnings. If the couple had stayed married, the joint return would have split this future income as jointly 
theirs when earned. The payment on divorce, in effect, is doing the same thing. Thus, the payments are analogous to 
guaranteed payments if the amount of the payment is determined at the time of the settlement (by reference to the present 
value of the expected return on the medical degree, for example) or to a distributive share if future payments to be made 
will be tied to actual earnings of the payor spouse.”). 
 262 26 U.S.C. § 736 (2012) distinguishes between payments made in liquidation of a partner’s interest.  
 263 Kornhauser, supra note 164, at 1440 (highlighting that the model may not account for the complexity of part-
nership rules: “Unless the model is expanded to include the complex partnership tax rules regarding special allocations, 
however, it cannot take into account the unequal contributions, benefits and control that occurred during the marriage.”). 
 264 An analogy may be made here to an involuntary conversion. Dodge, supra note 60, at 162–63. 
 265 Indeed, there is reason to believe court alimony awards systematically undervalue the lost or damaged human 
capital, settling for only partial compensation. Scott, supra note 124, at 1310–11 (“Although some modern law reform 
proposals advocate fully compensating the homemaker for loss of earning capacity or for her continuing interest in her 
former spouse’s human capital, courts currently do not pursue either goal. Rather, alimony generally provides support so 
that the formerly dependent spouse can ‘re-tool,’ acquiring the necessary education and training to become self-sufficient. 
A relatively small percentage of divorces include alimony awards, suggesting that the ability to obtain even modest 
employment disqualifies a former homemaker from support.” (footnote omitted)). As such, accepting the court’s valua-
tion of human capital as its basis may err on the side of understating costs. 
 266 See Starnes, supra note 16, at 281.  
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respecting investments of human capital as true costs—is consistent with the 
gain theory view of alimony. Gain theory focuses on ensuring that Sarah does 
not leave the marriage enriched by Susan’s human capital investment. Thus, 
the award is keyed toward allowing Susan to recover her investment. As in 
the case of contribution theory and reimbursement alimony as well as peri-
odic alimony and loss theory, gain theory suggests that Sarah’s human capital 
investment should create something like basis to allow her to recover her full 
investment—undiminished by tax.267  
By tracing the proposed concept of alimony basis through different 
types of and rationales for alimony, these three examples help illustrate the 
core contribution of alimony theory for tax: alimony payments do not indis-
putably give rise to income in the form of taxable gain. Though current doc-
trine does not permit basis in human capital or basis created by human capi-
tal, alimony theory grounds the very right to alimony in the idea that such 
investments are very real costs. It also gives a property-like hue to alimony, 
human capital, and marital capital. The concept of alimony basis points to a 
compromise between current tax law and family law theory: Investments in 
and of human capital do not create conventional basis, but alimony theory 
pushes us to recognize them as costs. Divorce triggers a potential loss that 
alimony seeks to prevent by requiring a return of those costs. By thus char-
acterizing alimony, alimony theory pushes tax law to consider whether ali-
mony should create taxable gain or whether it is, in fact, closer to a return of 
something like basis. Rather than overhaul basis entirely, we can respect ali-
mony theory and its views on human capital in marriage and divorce by let-
ting the theoretical concept of alimony basis enter the Code in a more limited 
and less controversial fashion—namely, as a ground for supporting the pro-
posed exclusion of alimony from the tax base of the recipient. Stated differ-
ently, where alimony is awarded, tax law can defer to family law and assume 
the presence of equal and offsetting alimony basis. 
b. A Note on the Unit View and the Tax Treatment of the 
Payor 
The prior discussion focused on the implications of alimony theory for 
the tax treatment of the alimony recipient. But alimony and human capital 
theory applied to the tax treatment of the payor provides a related but distinct 
rationale for the proposed reform. 
Recall that the current tax treatment of alimony continues to view the 
divorced couple as a unit, taxing the alimony only once.268 The proposed re-
form maintains this approach. Enforcing any alimony regime that allows a 
deduction to the payor creates significant compliance concerns, and where 
compliance concerns are significant, a circumscribed notion of the family as 
  
 266 Singer, supra note 141, at 2435–36. 
 268 See supra Part I.  
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a unit is frequently appropriate.269 Assuming the validity of the unit view and 
adopting arguendo the proposed reform, two options emerge for the tax treat-
ment of the payor: (1) continuing to allow the payor to deduct alimony paid, 
or (2) keeping alimony in the base of the payor by denying a deduction. The 
latter is both the most coherent and easily administrable choice.270  
Just as human capital theories of alimony suggest that tax should recog-
nize investments in and of human capital as true costs that create alimony 
basis, the same theories hold that the payor received a true benefit from the 
recipient spouse’s investments. Keeping alimony in the base of the payor 
provides an opportunity to tax that benefit as income.271 Had the couple re-
mained married, the benefit conferred might have been viewed as imputed 
income, a gift, or an accumulation of human capital.272 Conventionally, such 
gains are not taxed, but it does not follow that they are not income. Imputed 
income, for example, remains untaxed not because we cannot identify it as 
income but, instead, because it is too difficult to tax.273 Indeed, scholars have 
  
 269 Geier, supra note 14, at 431. The author has argued elsewhere that Congress and the Service 
utilize a relatively circumscribed notion of the family when matters of compliance arise. See Davis, supra 
note 13, at 199–200. 
 270 Taxing individuals on income that is not ultimately at their disposal can quickly give rise to de-
bates over endowment taxation. See generally Kirk J. Stark, Enslaving the Beachcomber: Some Thoughts 
on the Liberty Objections to Endowment Taxation, 18 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 47 (2005). The proposed disal-
lowance of a deduction for alimony paid falls far short of taxing individuals on income they could earn 
but for those interested in endowment taxation. 
 271 Herein, human capital theories of alimony provide a response to a potential challenge to the ar-
gument that alimony is not clearly income to the recipient. Critics may contend that rather than a nontax-
able return of capital, alimony is delayed payment for services rendered and, as such, is still income to the 
recipient. But consider the lessons of alimony theory in conjunction with the unit view. Loss, gain, and 
contribution theories all seek to (a) respect the recipient’s human and financial capital investments as true 
costs and (b) prevent the payor spouse from leaving the marriage enriched by the recipient’s investments. 
But even if alimony is construed as delayed wages paid to the recipient, an alimony deduction remains 
improper because the deduction results in the payor spouse being untaxed on at least some of the benefit 
conferred by the recipient spouse. A spouse who pays $20,000 in alimony has been enriched to the tune 
of $20,000 but, after taking a deduction for alimony paid, will have paid only $12,080, assuming a 39.6 
percent tax rate. Though she paid $20,000 in alimony, the deduction saves her $7,920, making her out-of-
pocket cost substantially less than the extent to which she was enriched. Such enrichment violates the very 
theories that give rise to a right to alimony. By keeping the alimony in the tax base of the payor, the 
proposed reform upholds the idea that the payor spouse should not leave the marriage enriched at the cost 
of the recipient spouse’s human capital. Of course, alimony could be income to both the payor and the 
recipient, but the unit view counsels against taxing alimony to both parties. 
 272 See Mary Louise Fellows, Rocking the Tax Code: A Case Study of Employment-Related Child-
Care Expenditures, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 307, 358 (1998) (acknowledging and critiquing this ap-
proach to imputed income in the family). 
 273 Id. (“The first reason for its exclusion from the definition of the ideal income is that it is admin-
istratively difficult to value. The second reason for its exclusion is that it is viewed as inconsequential for 
determining taxpayers’ ability to pay. Its trivial importance is based on the presumption that imputed 
income, most especially imputed income from services, varies ‘with considerable regularity, from one 
income class to the next, along the income scale.’ The third reason for its exclusion is that to include 
imputed income in the tax base would be inconsistent with American values that require limited 
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suggested that taxing imputed income from the benefits created by, for ex-
ample, stay-at-home spouses could create a more equitable tax system.274 Al-
imony could function, then, as a delayed tax on the imputed income of the 
payor spouse.275 
Ultimately, the truth of the substance of alimony may elude us or may 
not be susceptible to ready tax classification. Asking one spouse to continue 
to support another may be the result of multiple policy goals that are some-
times in tension.276 At the very least, the concerns advanced by contemporary 
alimony theorists—that absent alimony one spouse would be enriched be-
cause of the other’s investments in and of human capital—suggest that the 
income question of alimony is not easily answered. Family law theory of al-
imony calls into question whether the recipient spouse truly has a taxable 
gain, while it also identifies untaxed income in the hands of the payor spouse. 
Though there are compelling reasons to support this argument—reasons sim-
ilar to those invoked by scholars who argue for an expansion of the section 
104 exclusion or the reform of tax treatment of educational costs—human 
capital theory is not the only justification for the proposed reform. What fol-
lows are supporting rationales for a no-deduction/exclusion alimony regime.  
3. Administrability, Compliance, and Equity to Boot! 
Family law gives tax law tools with which to evaluate to whom alimony 
should be taxed, and this Article has argued that reconciling tax and family 
law concepts of alimony is the best path to reform. However, independent of 
analyzing what alimony is in substance and the tax treatment that should fol-
low, administrability, compliance, and equity concerns all also point toward 
the wisdom of taxing alimony to the payor rather than the recipient. For those 
unwilling to accept that alimony is a nontaxable return of alimony basis in or 
of human capital, the following parts provide strong alternative rationales for 
  
governmental interference with an individual’s private life. Although many policymakers might argue 
that, without unduly sacrificing administrative ease or individual privacy, more imputed income, espe-
cially from property, should be included in the tax base to more accurately measure each taxpayer’s ability 
to pay, no one seriously argues that all imputed income could or should be included in the tax base.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 274 See, e.g., Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571, 1623–24 (1996) (a highly 
influential article in the area). 
 275 The divorce provides the moment that fixes the value of the imputed income. Critics may argue 
that taxing the imputed income of some couples creates an inequity insofar as other married couples’ 
imputed income continues to elude taxation. The intersection of taxation and marriage is a fraught area, 
and this Article makes no attempt to solve all its policy challenges. Indeed, the author supports proposals 
that seek to acknowledge the differently situated nature of, for example, dual-earner couples and single-
earner households. For a recent excellent example of this, see Shannon Weeks McCormack, Overtaxing 
the Working Family: Uncle Sam and the Childcare Squeeze, 114 MICH. L. REV. 559 (2016). Such pro-
posals would, indirectly, account for the greater imputed income of some couples in a way similar to the 
reform advanced by this Article. 
 276 See Scott, supra note 124, at 1242–44. 
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the proposed reform. For those in agreement with the human capital rationale 
articulated above, the following discussions bolster the argument that the 
weight of theory, practice, and policy concerns is on the side of a no-deduc-
tion/exclusion regime.  
a. Alimony of One, Property Settlement of Another  
As discussed in Part II, family law doctrine and practice blur the line 
between alimony and property settlement.277 Where couples have little or no 
property, alimony is awarded in lieu of a property settlement.278 The alimony 
factors adopted by many states push courts to consider the totality of the 
award, tweaking alimony as necessary to account for insufficient property 
awards to a recipient spouse.279 As rehabilitative or reimbursement awards 
rise,280 the dividing line between property settlement and alimony further 
weakens.281 Doctrinally, both types of alimony run the risk of being catego-
rized as property settlements under the recapture rules of section 71(f).282 
Theoretically, both forms of alimony cast their respective payments as pay-
ments for lost human capital or investments in the human capital of the payor 
(or a mix thereof), giving each a property-like hue. Yet current tax law still 
pretends there is a clear line between support and property settlement. Tax 
law simply should not enter the morass with its own definition of alimony 
that erects a wall between alimony and property settlement that family law 
doctrine, practice, and theory do not support.  
b. A Meaningful Change in Rates 
In adopting the current regime, Congress cited high marginal rates that 
left alimony payors with little disposable income after alimony and taxes as 
a key motivator of the change in law.283 Current law dramatically weakens 
that justification. The highest marginal rate for ordinary income is now 39.6 
percent,284 less than half of the 88 percent rate in place when lawmakers were 
concerned with payors’ disposable incomes.285 The argument that the rate 
  
 277 See Singer, supra note 175, at 45; supra Part II. 
 278 See, e.g., Bold v. Bold, 574 A.2d 552, 556 (Pa. 1990). 
 279 See supra notes 175–77 and accompanying materials. 
 280 Morgan, supra note 15, at 74. 
 281 See Carbone, supra note 144, at 1499; discussion supra Part II. 
 282 Melcher, supra note 15, at 78 (“Recapture is more of a trap than a rule.”).  
 283 See supra Part I.  
 284 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (providing the rate schedules for different filing statuses). For schedules 
indexed for inflation, see REV. PROC. 2017-58. This rate does not account for payroll or state and local 
taxes.  
 285 For a comparison of historic rates, see Historic Highest Marginal Income Tax Rates, TAX POLICY 
CENTER, http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/historical-highest-marginal-income-tax-rates (last 
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concern should no longer apply is not new; it was first made by Professor 
Donald Berman after the 1984 reforms aimed at simplifying the tax treatment 
of alimony.286 Importantly, at the time Professor Berman wrote, the highest 
marginal rate was 50 percent, still higher than in current law.287 Stripped of 
the concern that without a deduction, alimony payors would be taxed into 
poverty, Professor Berman finds little to recommend the deduction.288 Lower 
rates on ordinary income are not, in isolation, sufficient to justify taxing in-
come to one party over another. However, when high rates—rather than a 
principled view of alimony as more properly income of the recipient—were 
a primary justification for shifting the tax burden of alimony to the recipient, 
then a significant reduction in those rates should change the discussion.289 
The current rate schedule thus places another thumb on the scale in favor of 
the proposed reform.290 
c. Tax Planning, Equity, and the Social Safety Net 
Though rarely the primary rationale, some scholars have posited that 
recipient spouses may receive more income after tax in a deduction/inclusion 
world.291 A simple example clarifies how: Assume a payor in the 28 percent 
  
visited Mar. 16, 2018). As alimony shifts from long-term to short-term forms, this concern is further 
mitigated. See Shehan, et al., Alimony: An Anomaly in Family Social Science, 51 FAM. RELATIONS 308 
(2002) (noting that though the data are scant, rehabilitative alimony is on the rise). 
 286 Donald H. Berman, The Alimony Deduction: Time to Slaughter the Sacred Cow, 5 AM. J. TAX 
POL’Y 49, 49–50 (1985).  
 287 Id. at 49. Professor Berman argues, in no uncertain terms, that the current tax treatment of alimony 
“results solely from provisions enacted to give relief to taxpayers burdened by both high alimony pay-
ments and the high income tax rates imposed during World War II. The original reason for these provi-
sions has disappeared . . . . Since the law governing the deduction of payments to a former spouse is 
inequitable, complex, and arbitrary, I argue that all payments to and from divorced taxpayers should be 
treated as nondeductible by the payor and not includible in the income of the recipient.” Id. (footnotes 
omitted). Professor Berman goes on to argue that the degree of planning section 71 would permit (Profes-
sor Berman wrote before the 1986 change to child support) created vertical and horizontal equity concerns 
because it benefited sophisticated taxpayers who structured agreements to achieve their preferred tax clas-
sification and make the best use of any rate disparities between recipient and payor. Id. at 56–58. Finding 
a thin line separating alimony, child support, and property settlements and finding the inequities and com-
plexities significant, Professor Berman finds no strong reason to preserve a deduction. Id. at 49, 76–79. 
 288 See id. 
 289 See Berman, supra note 286, at 49. 
 290 See Shehan, supra note 188, at 310 (noting that the data are scant, but rehabilitative alimony is 
on the rise). 
 291 Hjorth, supra note 88, at 187–88; see also Geier, supra note 14, at 365 (“[T]ax arbitrage is built 
into the current system already, that people do not get divorced in order to engage in income-shifting for 
tax purposes, and that the income-shifting that can occur is likely a good and defensible outcome on public 
policy grounds in most situations in which it can occur. Such income-shifting encourages the higher-
bracket spouse to transfer funds to the lower-bracket spouse (presumably the more needy spouse), often 
leaving the lower-bracket spouse with more after-tax income than she would otherwise have if income-
shifting were disallowed.”). 
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bracket and a recipient in the 15 percent bracket.292 The recipient spouse 
wants $20,000 a year after tax. The couple could decide to bust section 71 by 
agreeing that the payments are not alimony and are not deductible.293 But do-
ing so would leave money on the table. The payor should instead offer an 
additional $3,500 annually but require that amount to satisfy the section 
71/215 regime. After paying federal taxes at 15 percent, the recipient still has 
approximately $20,000, and the payor’s out-of-pocket cost is less because of 
the value of the deduction.294 A savvy recipient could push to share in the tax 
savings, thereby receiving more after tax than might be feasible without the 
prospect of arbitrage.  
Accepting arguendo that encouraging such planning is appropriate, a 
compressed rate schedule makes such planning harder to accomplish.295 More 
importantly, however, such planning is not so clearly good policy that it alone 
justifies deduction/inclusion treatment. Indeed, by permitting private order-
ing and arbitrage, the current law may give rise to inequity. Those who are 
sophisticated enough to engage in planning may lower their effective tax 
rates when compared to those who do not understand the arbitrage potential 
in sections 71 and 215, making the government subsidize their alimony pay-
ments.296  
Further, the fact that some spouses may have more income after-tax if 
they plan correctly should not justify a largely ineffective tax regime. If we 
are concerned about the financial situation of divorced couples,297 we should 
not comfort ourselves with the idea that well-advised individuals can exploit 
progressive tax rates to their advantage. Indeed, the individuals most likely 
to engage in such planning may be the least likely to be at risk, while lower-
income couples, whose standard of living suffers post-divorce, are both un-
likely to be well advised or be able to utilize such arbitrage to their advantage. 
  
 292 See REV. PROC. 2017-58 (relevant tax brackets).  
 293 Recall that the couple can do so by the terms of section 71 itself.  
 294 This is so because of the rate differential between the spouses. The payor’s after-tax cost of a 
$23,500 alimony payment is $16,920, and the recipient retains $19,975 after tax. 
 295 See Jaffe & Riff, supra note 91, at 29 (noting that arbitrage is unavailable when both spouses are 
in the same tax bracket).  
 296 See, e.g., supra note 63. This critique may be particularly salient in the current climate of marked 
wealth inequality. Recent tax return data support the argument that the alimony deduction inures to the 
benefit of the wealthy, with more than 34 percent of alimony deduction for taxable year 2011 taken by 
those with AGI of $500,000 or more. SOI Tax Stats – Individual Income Tax Re-
turns, IRS.GOV, https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-individual-income-tax-returns (last visited 
May 1, 2018). 
 297 Such concern might be warranted. For a discussion of the financial impacts of divorce, see Amelia 
Hill, Men Become Richer After Divorce, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 24, 2009, 7:01 PM), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/lifeandstyle/2009/jan/25/divorce-women-research. See also Darlena Cunha, The Divorce Gap, 
THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 28, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/04/the-divorce-
gap/480333/; Jonathan D. Fisher & Angela C. Lyons, Till Debt Do Us Part: A Model of Divorce and 
Personal Bankruptcy, 4 REV. ECON. HOUSEHOLD 35 (2006) (noting the need for further study to determine 
if divorce causes financial strain or results from it); Jay L. Zagorsky, Marriage and Divorce’s Impact on 
Wealth, 41 J. SOC. 406 (2005).  
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In short, we should not weakly encourage exploiting the progressive rate 
structure in the hopes that the recipient spouse and/or child are in a better 
after-tax position.  
d. Making Compliance and Enforcement Easier  
Setting aside all the previously discussed rationales, compliance con-
cerns strongly support the proposed no-deduction/exclusion regime. Schol-
arship on compliance and IRS data establish that the compliance rate where 
there is neither withholding nor information reporting is 44 percent, mark-
edly lower than the overall compliance rate of 83.1 percent.298 Keeping ali-
mony in the tax base of the payor is simpler than and should boost compli-
ance above that of the current regime.299 Because no deduction would be al-
lowed and no inclusion required by the recipient under the proposed reform, 
there is no risk of mismatch or overstated deduction. Gone too would be the 
complexity of the excess alimony rules. Though the proposed reform would 
not eliminate the need for representation in divorce, it would take the prob-
lem of tax planning out of consideration.  
CONCLUSION 
Tax law has long struggled with the proper treatment of alimony, and 
taxpayers, courts, the Service, and the fisc continue to wrestle with the cur-
rent regime. This Article draws on the insights of family law theory to reform 
the tax alimony regime. Because family law theory respects investments in 
and of human capital as true costs, it challenges tax to find a means of re-
specting those costs so as not to frustrate the purpose of alimony itself. Ali-
mony basis provides the solution. It enables tax law to respect the key con-
tribution of family law theory of alimony: that alimony is not taxable income 
to the recipient. Alimony basis provides a theoretical offset to any potential 
alimony income—a way to treat alimony as what family law theory believes 
it to be in substance: a nontaxable return of or compensation for lost or dam-
aged human capital. Dispelling the idea that alimony is clearly income to the 
recipient removes this common objection to the reform advocated by this 
Article: unifying the tax treatment of transfers at or incident to divorce. Ra-
tionalizing the tax alimony regime with family law in this way simplifies tax 
administration and compliance and reduces opportunities for tax planning 
  
 298 Problems at the Internal Revenue Service: Closing the Tax Gap and Preventing Identity Theft: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, Subcomm. on Gov’t Org., Efficiency, and 
Fin. Mgmt, 112th Cong. 4 (2012) (statement of Hon. J. Russell George, Treasury Inspector General for 
Tax Admin.); see Lederman, supra note 27, at 1736; IRS Releases New Tax Gap Estimates, IRS.GOV, 
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-releases-new-tax-gap-estimates-compliance-rates-remain-statisti-
cally-unchanged-from-previous-study (last visited March 30, 2018). 
 299 See Geier, supra note 14, at 434–35 (arguing against the no-deduction/exclusion in the name of 
simplicity). 
2018] A HUMAN CAPITAL THEORY OF ALIMONY AND TAX 407 
that benefit high-income individuals. Rather than persist in its adherence to 
a now hard-to-defend view that alimony and property settlements are clearly 
distinguishable, tax law should embrace contemporary theories of alimony 
and erase the line in the sand between transfers at or incident to divorce. 
 
